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INTRODUCTION 
The difference between becoming a successful entrepreneur 
in a fast-growing industry and becoming a federal prisoner may 
largely depend on which state you place your business in. This is 
the reality for those in the marijuana business. This predicament 
occurs because of two issues: the increasing spread of marijuana 
legalization for both medical and recreational use at the state 
level,1 and the Department of Justice’s decision not to enforce fed-
eral marijuana laws against those in compliance with their states’ 
laws, while maintaining full enforcement against everyone else.2 
While this seems unproblematic at first glance, 18 USC 
§ 3553(a) provides that one of the factors judges must consider in 
imposing a criminal sentence is “the need to avoid unwarranted 
sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who 
have been found guilty of similar conduct.”3 The sentence should 
also “reflect the seriousness of the offense.”4 Because the federal 
government is willing to accede to popular will and forego enforce-
ment of marijuana laws in many states, the seriousness of the 
offense is lessening. This selective enforcement has created a re-
gime in which some ostensible drug felons are allowed to become 
entrepreneurs and others who commit the same acts go to prison. 
As such, conforming to these two provisions suggests that a sub-
stantial downward variance from the sentence a court would or-
dinarily impose on a federal marijuana offender is appropriate. 
 
 † BA 2011, The Ohio State University; JD Candidate 2017, The University of Chicago 
Law School. 
 1 See Part II.A. 
 2 See Part II.B. 
 3 18 USC § 3553(a)(6). 
 4 18 USC § 3553(a)(2)(A). 
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Indeed, in light of the nature of federal drug sentencing, it is 
imperative that the judiciary acts on this issue. Federal sentenc-
ing is based primarily on interaction between the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines (the Guidelines), statutory mandatory mini-
mum sentences, and judicial discretion.5 While the Guidelines 
were once mandatory, it was clear from their inception that the 
United States Sentencing Commission (the Commission) both 
needed and expected judges on the ground to provide feedback in 
order to maximize the Guidelines’ effectiveness. This feedback 
loop was built in to ensure that the Guidelines reflected a proper 
balance between the wide-scale policy analysis of the Commission 
and the actual experiences of federal judges.6 
This Comment argues that because a majority of states,7 both 
the executive and legislative branches of the federal government, 
and the American people have placed decreasing emphasis on the 
seriousness of marijuana crimes, judges should use their discre-
tion to impose primarily noncustodial sentences for marijuana of-
fenders. Furthermore, judges should use their discretion in this 
way because selective enforcement of federal marijuana laws as 
currently implemented creates a system that doubly advantages 
white citizens—both decriminalizing and allowing them to profit 
from marijuana activities, while simultaneously exacerbating ex-
isting racial disparities in marijuana sentencing. 
Part I of this Comment examines the role of the Guidelines 
in federal criminal sentencing and their interaction with the 
 
 5 Statutory mandatory minimum sentences, and prosecutors’ discretion in bringing 
charges that trigger them, are the subject of much debate. Compare, for example, Ilene H. 
Nagel, Foreword: Structuring Sentencing Discretion; The New Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines, 80 J Crim L & Crimin 883, 895–99 (1990) (noting that Congress’s decision to move 
away from indeterminate sentencing was largely a reaction to rampant and unjustified 
variations in sentences imposed for factually identical crimes), with David Bjerk, Making 
the Crime Fit the Penalty: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion under Mandatory Minimum 
Sentencing, 48 J L & Econ 591, 592 (2005) (“While mandatory minimum sentencing laws 
appear to significantly curtail the discretionary influence judges have over the minimum 
sentences they impose on convicted criminals, the point has been raised that these laws 
may simply shift the discretion to other actors in the judicial process, namely, prosecu-
tors.”) (citation omitted). That debate, however, is largely outside the scope of this Comment. 
 6 See Part I.A. 
 7 At the time of writing, a majority of states, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the District of 
Columbia have either legalized or decriminalized marijuana in some way. See State Med-
ical Marijuana Laws (National Conference of State Legislatures, Sept 29, 2016), archived 
at http://perma.cc/VX5R-L7NF (“A total of 25 states, the District of Columbia, Guam and 
Puerto Rico now allow for comprehensive public medical marijuana and cannabis pro-
grams.”); Marijuana Overview (National Conference of State Legislatures, Sept 2, 2016), 
archived at http://perma.cc/HR4D-LNV3 (“Twenty-one states and the District of Columbia 
have decriminalized small amounts of marijuana.”). 
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§ 3553(a) sentencing factors. Part II examines the current public 
perception of marijuana and the status of marijuana laws on the 
state and federal levels. Part III focuses on several analogies to 
the current state of marijuana prosecution and sentencing. These 
analogies compare modern examples of judicial discretion in ap-
plying the Guidelines surrounding cocaine base and possession of 
child pornography, as well as the historical example of the Fugitive 
Slave Laws of 17938 and 1850,9 to the current regime of federal 
marijuana nonenforcement. 
Part IV argues that these analogies suggest that when the 
political branches use their power to corrupt the Commission’s 
empirical methods, a pattern emerges: a relatively politically 
powerless or unpopular group is disproportionately burdened for 
political benefit. As the analysis of the Fugitive Slave Laws 
shows, this theme has roots in the earliest parts of American his-
tory. Part IV provides an analysis of the § 3553(a) factors based 
on the popular perceptions of marijuana and the state of marijuana 
laws described in Part II, as well as the lessons learned from the 
various analogies covered in Part III. Finally, Part IV presents a 
solution, ultimately arguing that, to the extent a defendant’s ac-
tions violate only federal marijuana laws, the § 3553(a) factors 
suggest that a judge should impose a noncustodial sentence. 
I.  DRUG LAWS: THEN AND NOW 
The current state of drug sentencing in this country is based 
on the regime created by Congress in the Sentencing Reform Act 
of 1984.10 This Part traces that history beginning with Congress’s 
action in 1984 and concluding with the current state of drug laws. 
A. The Guidelines: An Evolving Sentencing Tool 
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 created the United States 
Sentencing Commission to establish a uniform system of “sen-
tencing policies and practices” by implementing “detailed” federal 
sentencing guidelines for judges to follow.11 The pre-Guidelines 
 
 8 Act of Feb 12, 1793, 1 Stat 302. 
 9 Act of Sept 18, 1850, 9 Stat 462. 
 10 Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 1987. 
 11 United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 1A1.1 (Nov 1, 2015) 
(“USSG”) (describing the purpose of the Commission as “establish[ing] sentencing policies 
and practices for the federal criminal justice system that will assure the ends of justice by 
promulgating detailed guidelines prescribing the appropriate sentences for offenders con-
victed of federal crimes”). 
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sentencing regime afforded judges wide discretion. This discre-
tion, in combination with the widespread use of parole, led to sig-
nificant disparities in the harshness of sentences for similarly sit-
uated offenders, which was seen as “fundamentally at odds with 
ideals of equality and the rule of the law.”12 At the same time, 
because of the perceived failure of utilizing sentencing and parole 
to further rehabilitative goals, there was a shift in the nation’s 
sentencing philosophy away from imposing sentences based pri-
marily on those goals.13 
These changes culminated in the passage of the Guidelines. 
The evolution of the Guidelines from a mandatory sentencing re-
gime to their current advisory status has been covered exten-
sively.14 What is important for the purposes of this Comment is 
that the Guidelines were designed to evolve. Statutory mecha-
nisms built into the Sentencing Reform Act ensured that “[t]he 
Commission’s work [would be] ongoing.”15 The Commission must 
“publish[ ] guideline amendment proposals . . . and conduct[ ] 
hearings to solicit input on those proposals from experts and other 
members of the public,”16 and must “review[ ] and revise[ ] the 
guidelines in consideration of comments it receives from members 
of the federal criminal justice system,” as well as “data it receives 
from sentencing courts.”17 
Unfortunately, the Commission abandoned this traditional 
empirical approach in formulating the original Guidelines for mari-
juana and other drug-related offenses,18 and so it is all the more 
important that sentencing judges use their discretion to provide 
the Commission with data points that accurately reflect the 18 
 
 12 Kate Stith and Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative 
History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 Wake Forest L Rev 223, 225–27 (1993). 
See also USSG § 1A1.3 (stating that giving judges broad sentencing ranges to select from 
“would have risked a return to the wide disparity that Congress established the Commis-
sion to reduce”). 
 13 See Stith and Koh, 28 Wake Forest L Rev at 227–29, 239–42 (cited in note 12). 
 14 See, for example, Ryan Scott Reynolds, Note, Equal Justice under Law: Post-
Booker, Should Federal Judges Be Able to Depart from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
to Remedy Disparity between Codefendants’ Sentences?, 109 Colum L Rev 538, 540–49 
(2009); Christine DeMaso, Note, Advisory Sentencing and the Federalization of Crime: 
Should Federal Sentencing Judges Consider the Disparity between State and Federal Sen-
tences under Booker?, 106 Colum L Rev 2095, 2098–2104 (2006); Susan R. Klein, The Re-
turn of Federal Judicial Discretion in Criminal Sentencing, 39 Valp U L Rev 693, 696–
734 (2005). 
 15 Rita v United States, 551 US 338, 350 (2007). 
 16 USSG § 1A2, citing 28 USC § 994(x). 
 17 USSG § 1A2, citing 28 USC § 994(o). 
 18 See Part IV.A.1. 
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USC § 3553(a) sentencing factors. These factors outline the con-
siderations that a sentencing judge must consider and announce 
when determining a defendant’s sentence.19 It is a faithful appli-
cation of these factors to the typical commission of a specific crime 
that a within-Guidelines sentence is meant to approximate.20 
Although the Commission intends for the Guidelines to rep-
licate applying the statutory sentencing factors, the Commission 
has not always succeeded in its pursuit of this goal. In several 
areas in which the Commission has abandoned its empirical 
ethos, such as in the cases of crack–powder cocaine ratio and child 
pornography possession, sentencing judges have varied from the 
Guidelines recommendations and caused both recommended and 
real reform.21 The Commission itself has recognized that the 
Guidelines are only one part of a “deliberative and dynamic pro-
cess that seeks to embody within federal sentencing policy the 
[statutory] purposes of sentencing.”22 And at this moment, in the 
realm of drug sentencing, the Commission seems highly amenable 
to feedback.23 
The Commission’s current treatment of the drug Guidelines 
is an excellent example of an attempt to evolve the Guidelines 
through empirical analysis.24 In 2014, the Commission promul-
gated a reduction in the Guidelines recommendation for drug sen-
tences that would result in an estimated 17.7 percent reduction 
 
 19 See 18 USC § 3553(a) (“The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not 
greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this sub-
section.”); 18 USC § 3553(c) (“The court, at the time of sentencing, shall state in open court 
the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence.”). 
 20 18 USC § 3553(b)(1), which was ruled unconstitutional by United States v Booker, 
543 US 220 (2005), required judges to impose a sentence within the established Guidelines 
range absent “an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not 
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the 
guidelines.” See also USSG § 1A1.4(b) (“The Commission intends the sentencing courts to 
treat each guideline as carving out a ‘heartland,’ a set of typical cases embodying the con-
duct that each guideline describes.”). 
 21 See Parts III.A–B. See also Brenda L. Tofte, Booker at Seven: Looking behind Sen-
tencing Decisions; What Is Motivating Judges?, 65 Ark L Rev 529, 559 (2012) (noting that 
“history dictates that change often begins in the district courtroom, where sentencing prac-
tices alert Congress to the need for reform . . . or when, for the sake of consistency and 
constitutional finality, sentencing issues demand the Supreme Court’s attention”). 
 22 USSG § 1A2. 
 23 See Patti B. Saris, A Generational Shift for Federal Drug Sentences, 52 Am Crim 
L Rev 1, 7–14 (2015) (describing changes in the criminal justice system over the last decade 
and the Commission’s research into the effects of sentencing reductions for drug crimes). 
 24 See id at 17–24. 
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in effected sentences.25 In evaluating whether to implement this 
change, the Commission considered past experience with reduc-
tions in crack cocaine offense recommendations,26 assessed how 
past changes to the Guidelines reduced the need for high sentenc-
ing baselines,27 and calculated the impact the change would have 
on reducing the prison population,28 in addition to considering 
broader issues like the potential impact on recidivism, plea bar-
gaining, and public safety.29 Additionally, the Commission used a 
similarly measured and rigorous analysis in determining whether 
to make its 2014 amendments to the drug Guidelines retroactive, 
including “comment and testimony from federal judges, members 
of Congress, advocacy organizations, religious leaders, legal prac-
titioners, and interested members of the public.”30 
Looking at the Commission’s empirical work more generally 
displays just how far the Commission strayed when originally 
promulgating the Guidelines for drug offenses. Today, the Com-
mission collects in-depth data on sentencing and compiles a 
yearly report known as the Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Sta-
tistics.31 This comprehensive report of “descriptive statistics on 
the application of the federal sentencing guidelines and [ ] se-
lected district, circuit, and national sentencing data” has been 
created and made publicly available for the last twenty years.32 
These yearly sourcebooks contain a wealth of detailed infor-
mation on virtually every aspect of federal sentencing. They in-
clude such detailed sentencing information as breakdowns of sen-
tences by circuit,33 by criminal offense,34 and by amount of 
 
 25 Id at 17, 20, citing United States Sentencing Commission, Sentencing Guidelines 
for United States Courts, 79 Fed Reg 25996, 25997 (2014), amending USSG § 1B1.10. 
 26 Saris, 52 Am Crim L Rev at 19 (cited in note 23). 
 27 Id at 19–21. 
 28 Id at 21 (calculating the number of prison beds saved per year by implementing 
the 2014 drug amendments). 
 29 Id at 19–21. 
 30 Saris, 52 Am Crim L Rev at 22–24 (cited in note 23). 
 31 See, for example, U.S. Sentencing Commission’s 2015 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing 
Statistics (United States Sentencing Commission), archived at http://perma.cc/LGK5-LQZV. 
 32 Id. See also Sourcebook Archives (United States Sentencing Commission), archived 
at http://perma.cc/ZZ7P-THN8 (compiling the last twenty years of sourcebooks). 
 33 See, for example, Table N-DC: Comparison of Sentence Imposed and Position Rel-
ative to the Guideline Range by Circuit; Fiscal Year 2015 (United States Sentencing Com-
mission), archived at http://perma.cc/X8TN-QVDW (comparing national sentences to those 
imposed by the DC Circuit). 
 34 See, for example, Table 14: Length of Imprisonment for Offenders in Each Criminal 
History Category by Primary Offense Category; Fiscal Year 2015 (United States Sentencing 
Commission), archived at http://perma.cc/LGT9-74VQ (listing the length of imprisonment 
imposed sorted by the type of offense committed). 
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variation from the Guidelines range for the offense.35 Beyond these 
yearly descriptive reports, the Commission actively studies, pub-
lishes on, and reports to Congress on a wide variety of sentencing-
related topics,36 and has done this as far back as 1988.37 Perhaps 
in recognition of how much of a valuable resource the trove of 
sentencing-related data the Commission has collected is, the 
Commission makes its data files available for outside researchers 
who hope to perform their own quantitative studies.38 The Com-
mission goes so far as to provide researchers with “[g]uidance on 
how to avoid common pitfalls” of using the data it provides.39 It is 
this level of depth and dedication to the empirical ethos that the 
Commission has shown in other areas of its work that makes its 
abandonment of that ethos in creating the drug sentences so 
striking. 
B. United States v Booker and the Rise of § 3553(a) 
Before United States v Booker,40 the § 3553(a) factors were 
largely subsumed by the mandatory Guidelines, which dominated 
the sentencing inquiry.41 Booker refocused the sentencing inquiry 
onto an analysis of the statutory factors.42 Because the Court 
made the Guidelines advisory, they became one factor for the 
 
 35 See, for example, Table 31C: Below Guideline Range with Booker/18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553: Degree of Decrease for Offenders in Each Primary Offense Category; Fiscal Year 
2015 (United States Sentencing Commission), archived at http://perma.cc/AY5Z-BRAL 
(giving the median decreases in both number of months and percentage of months of im-
prisonment imposed relative to the Guidelines minimum for various crimes). 
 36 See generally, for example, Recidivism among Federal Offenders: A Comprehensive 
Overview (United States Sentencing Commission, Mar 2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/5WRG-J9FH. See also generally Report to the Congress: Impact of the Fair 
Sentencing Act of 2010 (United States Sentencing Commission, Aug 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/F9R3-WY3S. 
 37 See generally, for example, Gary J. Peters, Career Offender Guidelines (United 
States Sentencing Commission, Mar 25, 1988), archived at http://perma.cc/DNM8-ZU9E. 
 38 See Commission Datafiles (United States Sentencing Commission), archived at 
http://perma.cc/2XB7-KRF8 (providing outside “users with access to the Commission’s an-
nual and other special datafiles that support the Commission’s research agenda”). 
 39 Id. See also generally Lou Reedt, Courtney Semisch, and Kevin Blackwell, Effec-
tive Use of Federal Sentencing Data (Office of Research and Data, United States Sentenc-
ing Commission, Nov 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/79M5-YUQA.  
 40 543 US 220 (2005). 
 41 See Reynolds, Note, 109 Colum L Rev at 540–43 (cited in note 14); Booker, 543 US 
at 233–37. 
 42 See Booker, 543 US at 258–65. 
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courts to consider when imposing a sentence within the wide lat-
itude allowed by statute.43 The post-Booker cases further shaped 
how the sentencing inquiry should be performed. 
With the shift to an advisory Guidelines regime, analyzing 
the statutory sentencing factors in § 3553(a) became a much 
larger part of the sentencing inquiry. Section 3553(a) is a statu-
tory mandate directing judges toward the relevant factors that 
they must consider in assigning a sentence to a defendant.44 
Passed as part of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, these factors 
guide judges as they impose a sentence while still allowing them 
the potential for broad discretion to adjust a sentence to the cir-
cumstances of each individual defendant.45 Moreover, on appeal, 
a sentencing judge’s failure to properly account for the § 3553(a) 
sentencing factors could lead to reversal either on procedural 
grounds,46 or because the sentence was substantively unreason-
able.47 This appellate review is done under an abuse of discretion 
standard.48 These factors require a court to consider the particu-
lar characteristics of the defendant and that individual defend-
ant’s crime. For example, § 3553(a)(1) requires the court to con-
sider “the history and characteristics of the defendant” and “the 
nature and circumstances of the offense,” while § 3553(a)(2)(D) 
says that the defendant’s need for “educational or vocational 
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment” should 
also be a consideration.49 
This Comment, however, focuses on two of the sentencing fac-
tors that open themselves to more general application: 
§ 3553(a)(2)(A)’s requirement that a sentence “reflect the serious-
ness of the offense” and § 3553(a)(6)’s “need to avoid unwarranted 
sentence disparities.”50 In removing the mandatory nature of the 
Guidelines, and thus refocusing the sentencing inquiry on the 
 
 43 Id at 259–60. 
 44 See 18 USC § 3553(a) (requiring that “[t]he court, in determining the particular 
sentence to be imposed, shall consider” the factors laid out in the statute). 
 45 See, for example, 18 USC § 3553(a)(1). 
 46 Such a reversal can happen if, for example, the sentencing judge “fail[s] to consider 
the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v Reyes–Hernandez, 624 F3d 405, 409 (7th Cir 2010), 
quoting Gall v United States, 552 US 38, 51 (2007). 
 47 See Gall, 552 US at 51 (stating that appellate courts should review the reasonable-
ness of sentences by “tak[ing] into account the totality of the circumstances” below). 
 48 Id (“Assuming that the district court’s sentencing decision is procedurally sound, 
the appellate court should then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence 
imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard.”). 
 49 18 USC § 3553(a)(1), (2)(D). 
 50 18 USC § 3553(a)(2)(A), (6). 
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statutory sentencing factors, Booker failed to delineate exactly 
how the advisory Guidelines would interact with the statutory 
factors. Several subsequent Supreme Court cases clarified the 
gray areas left in sentencing procedure by Booker. 
Although Booker held that the Guidelines were advisory,51 
the Supreme Court maintained that they should still play an im-
portant role in sentencing. The Court emphasized that 
§ 3553(a)(4) still required sentencing courts to take account of the 
Guidelines in their decisions.52 After Booker, appellate courts of-
ten did so by applying a presumption of reasonableness to a sen-
tence imposed within the range of the Guidelines.53 This presump-
tion was upheld in Rita v United States.54 Rita made clear that 
while a presumption of reasonableness might apply to a within-
Guidelines sentence, a presumption of unreasonableness could 
not apply to an out-of-Guidelines sentence.55 This presumption of 
reasonableness was appropriate in part because the Guidelines 
were not static, but were instead a constantly evolving balance of 
information from various actors within the criminal justice sys-
tem. As the Court itself described: 
The statutes and the Guidelines themselves foresee continu-
ous evolution helped by the sentencing courts and courts of 
appeals in that process. The sentencing courts, applying the 
Guidelines in individual cases, may depart (either pursuant to 
the Guidelines or, since Booker, by imposing a non-Guidelines 
sentence). The judges will set forth their reasons. The courts 
of appeals will determine the reasonableness of the resulting 
sentence. The Commission will collect and examine the re-
sults. In doing so, it may obtain advice from prosecutors, de-
fenders, law enforcement groups, civil liberties associations, 
 
 51 Booker, 543 US at 259–60. 
 52 See id at 261–63. 
 53 See, for example, United States v Green, 436 F3d 449, 457 (4th Cir 2006), quoting 
United States v Newsom, 428 F3d 685, 687 (7th Cir 2005) (“[A] sentence imposed ‘within 
the properly calculated Guidelines range . . . is presumptively reasonable.’”) (ellipsis in 
original). 
 54 551 US 338, 341 (2007). 
 55 See id at 354–55. See also United States v Howard, 454 F3d 700, 703 (7th Cir 2006) 
(rejecting a presumption of unreasonableness for an out-of-Guidelines sentence prior to 
Rita); United States v Matheny, 450 F3d 633, 642 (6th Cir 2006) (same); United States v 
Myers, 439 F3d 415, 417 (8th Cir 2006) (same); United States v Moreland, 437 F3d 424, 
433 (4th Cir 2006) (same). 
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experts in penology, and others. And it can revise the Guide-
lines accordingly.56 
Rita makes clear that the Guidelines, both in their inception 
and in the Supreme Court’s interpretation, are designed to be 
molded by an ongoing process of evaluation and feedback by the 
various members of the criminal justice system. 
While Rita confirmed the continuing vitality of the Guide-
lines in the post-Booker era, the Supreme Court would go on to 
further assert the authority of a sentencing judge to deviate from 
the Guidelines when appropriate. In Kimbrough v United States,57 
the Supreme Court held that it was properly within a sentencing 
court’s discretion to deviate from the 100-to-1 crack–powder co-
caine drug-weight ratio prescribed by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 
198658 (“1986 Act”) and adopted by the Commission in the Guide-
lines.59 This deviation could occur based on the sentencing court’s 
own belief that application of the ratio was unreasonable, largely 
because the ratio illustrated an underlying issue with the Guide-
lines’ drug-sentencing regime.60 As the Court noted, “The Com-
mission did not use [its] empirical approach [of evaluating past 
sentencing practices] in developing the Guidelines sentences for 
drug-trafficking offenses. Instead, it employed the 1986 Act’s 
weight-driven scheme.”61 This led the sentencing judge at issue to 
believe that imposition of a within-Guidelines sentence would be 
overly punitive, and would violate § 3553(a)’s admonition to “im-
pose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to ef-
fectuate the purposes of punishment.62 
The Court clarified Kimbrough in Spears v United States,63 
stating that a sentencing judge could completely reject the 100-
to-1 crack ratio in favor of his own, and could use that judicially 
created ratio in every relevant case.64 Some language in Kimbrough 
suggested that a district court might not be able to categorically 
 
 56 Rita, 551 US at 350. 
 57 552 US 85 (2007). 
 58 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 § 1002, Pub L No 99-570, 100 Stat 3207, 3207-2, cod-
ified as amended at 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(A)–(B). 
 59 Kimbrough, 552 US at 109–10. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id at 96. 
 62 Id at 111, quoting 18 USC § 3553(a). 
 63 555 US 261 (2009) (per curiam). 
 64 Id at 265–66. 
 2016] Learning from History in Changing Times 2115 
 
reject the Guidelines’ crack–powder cocaine ratio.65 Spears, how-
ever, held “that district courts are entitled to reject and vary cat-
egorically from the crack cocaine Guidelines based on a policy dis-
agreement with those Guidelines.”66 This holding was premised 
on the idea that, because Kimbrough allowed a deviation from the 
ratio in even a mine-run case, if that holding was to be given any 
effect, a district court must be allowed to implement its own ratio 
in place of the one implemented by the Commission.67 The al-
ternative, that only a disagreement based on an individualized 
assessment of the defendant was allowed, would either have the 
effect of making district court judges believe that the ratio insti-
tuted by the Commission was mandatory or cause district court 
judges to commit “institutionalized subterfuge” by masking their 
categorical disagreements as individualized assessments.68 
In an important display of the breadth of the discretion 
granted to judges in the post-Booker sentencing regime, Gall v 
United States69 reaffirmed that the § 3553(a) factors are the guid-
ing star for sentencing in the post-Booker world. Gall rejected the 
idea that variances from the Guidelines must be justified by “ex-
traordinary circumstances.”70 Some intermediate appellate courts 
used a “proportional” review for out-of-Guidelines sentences after 
Booker,71 but this review was held inconsistent with the advisory 
Guidelines regime.72 In its place, the Court established abuse of 
discretion review.73 
At the heart of the case, however, was the notion that while 
the Guidelines were the beginning of the sentencing inquiry, the 
end must always be an assessment of the § 3553(a) factors as they 
applied to the individual defendant.74 As Justice John Paul Stevens 
said, in the post-Booker world, “the range of choice [in imposing 
 
 65 Id at 265, quoting Kimbrough, 552 US at 111 (“The [district] court did not purport 
to establish a ratio of its own. Rather, it appropriately framed its final determination in 
line with § 3553(a)’s overarching instruction to ‘impose a sentence sufficient, but not 
greater than necessary’ to accomplish the sentencing goals advanced in § 3553(a)(2).”) 
(brackets in original). 
 66 Spears, 555 US at 265–66. 
 67 Id at 266–68. 
 68 Id at 266. 
 69 552 US 38 (2007). 
 70 Id at 47 (quotation marks omitted). 
 71 See, for example, United States v Claiborne, 439 F3d 479, 481 (8th Cir 2006). 
 72 Gall, 552 US at 45–48. 
 73 See id at 51, 59. 
 74 See id at 53–56. 
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a sentence] dictated by the facts of the case is significantly 
broadened.”75 
As Gall itself showed, this could mean a noncustodial sen-
tence for a defendant when the mandatory Guidelines would re-
quire incarceration for years.76 Brian Gall was a college student 
when he used, and became involved in a conspiracy to distribute, 
ecstasy.77 Within several months of joining the conspiracy, how-
ever, he voluntarily left it.78 After that point, he neither sold nor 
used illicit drugs, graduated, began to build a career, and was an 
otherwise-upstanding member of society.79 Years after his in-
volvement in drug distribution, he was charged with his crimes.80 
Because of his voluntary withdrawal and generally productive 
life, the district court sentenced him to probation.81 Upon impos-
ing this sentence, the district court noted that “[a]ny term of im-
prisonment in this case would be counter effective by depriving 
society of the contributions of the Defendant who, the Court has 
found, understands the consequences of his criminal conduct and 
is doing everything in his power to forge a new life.”82 In spite of 
this, had Gall had the misfortune to be sentenced during a regime 
of mandatory Guidelines, he would have been forced to spend be-
tween thirty and thirty-seven months imprisoned, unnecessarily 
disrupting his own career, as well as the lives of his friends and 
family members.83 
II.  MARIJUANA 
Much like the other drug Guidelines, the Guidelines for mari-
juana were not formulated by the Commission’s empirical ap-
proach. As such, they are susceptible to similar criticism as that 
levied against the crack–powder ratio by the cases leading to and 
following Kimbrough. Although the marijuana Guidelines may 
not be as inherently problematic as the crack–powder ratio, in re-
cent years the steady stream of states decriminalizing or legaliz-
ing marijuana has created issues for their execution. Changes in 
 
 75 Id at 59 (quotation marks omitted). 
 76 Gall, 552 US at 45, 53–56. 
 77 Id at 41. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id at 41–45. 
 80 Gall, 552 US at 42. 
 81 Id at 43–44. 
 82 Id at 44. 
 83 See id at 43, 45. 
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state criminal law would normally have little to no effect on fed-
eral sentencing. The federal government, however, has opted not 
to enforce federal marijuana laws against those in compliance 
with their states’ laws. Because of this policy, there are potential 
implications for sentencing judges attempting to faithfully impose 
sentences that adequately consider the seriousness of the offense 
and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, as re-
quired by the statutory sentencing factors.84 Before delving into 
the potential implications for sentencing, it is worth surveying 
the current state of marijuana laws in the states, in the federal 
government, and in the perception of the American public. 
A. Marijuana at the State Level 
At the time of writing, “[a] total of 25 states, the District of 
Columbia, Guam and Puerto Rico now allow for comprehensive 
public medical marijuana and cannabis programs.”85 Addition-
ally, four states—Alaska, Colorado, Oregon, and Washington—
and the District of Columbia have legalized marijuana for recre-
ational use.86 In 2015, the state of Ohio had a ballot initiative to 
legalize recreational and medical marijuana.87 Although this pro-
vision failed, its failure does not necessarily reflect Ohio voters’ 
preference to maintain the current regime of marijuana illegality; 
this failed state constitutional initiative also contained a provi-
sion that would have given a small group of businesses the exclu-
sive right to provide marijuana to the state.88 This constitution-
ally enforced oligopoly was opposed by a separate ballot initiative, 
which passed.89 Therefore, it is unclear whether Ohio voters 
were antimarijuana and anti-oligopoly or promarijuana and 
anti-oligopoly. In light of the fact that polling prior to the election 
 
 84 See 18 USC § 3553(a)(2)(A), (6). 
 85 State Medical Marijuana Laws (cited in note 7) (examining the various state med-
ical and recreational marijuana laws). 
 86 See Marijuana Overview (cited in note 7). 
 87 Ohio Marijuana Legalization Initiative, Issue 3 (2015) (Ballotpedia), archived at 
http://perma.cc/3YQS-TL5K (providing an overview of and various sources for information 
on the recreational marijuana legalization initiative on the ballot in Ohio). 
 88 See Mitch Smith and Sheryl Gay Stolberg, On Ballot, Ohio Grapples with Specter 
of Marijuana Monopoly (NY Times, Nov 1, 2015), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/ 
11/02/us/on-ballot-ohio-grapples-with-specter-of-marijuana-monopoly.html (visited Apr 
27, 2016) (Perma archive unavailable) (detailing the process by which ballot campaigners 
sought private investors to fund the campaign in exchange for licenses to commercially 
grow marijuana upon passage). 
 89 See Ohio Voters Reject Legal Pot, Pass Anti-monopoly, Redistricting Measures 
(WLWT Cincinnati, Nov 3, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/P3MK-7A3C. 
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suggested that the marijuana legalization initiative would pass,90 
as well as other polling that found 90 percent of voters supported 
medical marijuana,91 the latter scenario seems just as, if not 
more, likely than the former. 
Although Ohio chose not to legalize recreational marijuana, 
that state, as well as well as twenty others and the District of 
Columbia, has chosen to decriminalize possession of personal-use 
amounts of marijuana.92 Ohio’s willingness to consider moving 
from decriminalization to legalization is part of a wave of legisla-
tion across the country reconsidering how individual states treat 
marijuana. In fall 2016, three states had bills pending that would 
decriminalize marijuana.93 Ten states, meanwhile, had pending 
measures, constitutional amendments, or initiatives that would 
have legalized marijuana in some form.94 If history is any indica-
tion, many of these bills and measures will not pass in their cur-
rent form; some, however, will.95 This stream of experimentation 
and failure mixed with a steady trickle of success suggests that, 
although the states may not be in the midst of a marijuana revo-
lution, they are undertaking a slow yet consistent evolution. 
Given the lack of a major backlash to this stream of marijuana 
law liberalization by states that have not legalized or decriminal-
ized marijuana, it is likely that the evolution will continue stead-
ily onward.96 
 
 90 See Jackie Borchardt, Ohio Marijuana Legalization Ballot Issue Would Pass If 
Election Held Today, Kent State Poll Finds (Plain Dealer, Oct 14, 2015), archived at http:// 
perma.cc/P5ZT-8MQZ. 
 91 See Todd Dykes, Dissecting Marijuana’s Election Day Defeat in Ohio (WLWT 
Cincinnati, Dec 30, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/J57H-6W45; Florida, Ohio Back 
Personal Pot; Pennsylvania Split, Quinnipiac University Swing State Poll Finds; Keystone 
State Voters Say Attorney General Must Go (Quinnipiac, Oct 8, 2015), archived at http:// 
perma.cc/QGZ4-C66L. 
 92 See Marijuana Overview (cited in note 7). 
 93 See id (“Decriminalization bills currently are pending in legislatures in Illinois, 
Michigan and New Jersey.”). 
 94 See id. 
 95 See id (recapping a number of failed legalization and decriminalization bills from 
the years 2013, 2014, and 2015, as well as a number of successful decriminalization 
measures from the same time period).  
 96 While numerous states have voted down or otherwise chosen not to pass legaliza-
tion initiatives in the last few years, and the legislature of Idaho reaffirmed their commit-
ment to marijuana prohibition, no state has recently taken steps to counteract the tide of 
legalization by, for example, strengthening its own marijuana laws. At most, like Idaho, 
states have chosen to maintain the status quo. See Marijuana Overview (cited in note 7). 
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B. Marijuana in the Executive Branch and Congress 
All three branches of the federal government have signaled 
approval of the states’ experimentation with marijuana legaliza-
tion. In 2014, Congress passed an amendment to the yearly om-
nibus spending bill forbidding the use of appropriated funds to pre-
vent the implementation of state medical marijuana laws.97 This 
amendment was approved again in 2015, and it was included in 
that year’s spending bill as well.98 Known as the Rohrabacher-Farr 
Amendment, this provision passed the House of Representatives 
in 2015 by a vote of 242–186, and was sponsored or cosponsored 
by an equal number of Democratic and Republican representa-
tives.99 The strong bipartisan support behind this amendment 
suggests that Congress views marijuana with notably less seri-
ousness than it did earlier in the war on drugs, given how large 
of a marked shift from previous congressional actions during the 
war on drugs this appropriation measure represents. Previously, 
Congress had been content to allow state marijuana businesses to 
be raided by federal law enforcement100 and repeatedly refused to 
lessen the penalties for drug offenses.101 Even in the Fair Sentenc-
ing Act of 2010,102 which lowered the crack–powder ratio to 18-to-1, 
Congress “also directed the Sentencing Commission to ensure 
that the Guidelines provide penalty increases for a variety of ag-
gravating factors for all drug offenses,”103 and “actually created 12 
new enhancements that potentially increase the Guideline range 
 
 97 See Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 § 538, Pub L No 
113-235, 128 Stat 2130, 2217 (2014). See also Russell Berman, Why Congress Gave In to 
Medical Marijuana (The Atlantic, Dec 17, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/YFR4-CP8Q. 
 98 See Rohrabacher Hails Passage of Medical Marijuana Amendment (Rohrabacher, 
June 4, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/P73A-UCC7. 
 99 See id. 
 100 See, for example, Valerie Richardson, Feds Raid Colorado Medical Marijuana Op-
erations (Wash Times, Nov 21, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/49QX-FL3W (noting fed-
eral raids in California, Colorado, Montana, and Washington); Eric Gorski, John Ingold, 
and Kieran Nicholson, DEA Raids Four Denver Marijuana Sites Related to VIP Cannabis 
(Denver Post, Apr 30, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/X4UT-SG97. The Rohrabacher-
Farr Amendment has not completely stopped the Department of Justice from raiding 
state-legal marijuana businesses, much to the chagrin of the congresspersons who in-
cluded the ban within the bill. See Evan Halper, A Year after Congress Voted to End War 
on Medical Pot, Raids Continue in California (LA Times, Dec 29, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/ETY3-EB8P. 
 101 See, for example, Kimbrough, 552 US at 105–06 (noting Congress’s decision not to 
adopt the Commission’s lowered crack–powder cocaine ratio). 
 102 Pub L No 111-220, 124 Stat 2372. 
 103 Mark Osler and Mark W. Bennett, A “Holocaust in Slow Motion?” America’s Mass 
Incarceration and the Role of Discretion, 7 DePaul J Soc Just 117, 157–58 (2014). See also 
Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 §§ 2, 5–6, 124 Stat at 2372–74. 
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across all drug types.”104 These enhancements have the same force 
in marijuana prosecutions as they do in prosecutions of “harder” 
drugs. As such, in the last four years, Congress has shifted from 
ratcheting up the potential criminal liability of all marijuana de-
fendants to prohibiting the prosecution of a significant portion of 
them. 
Indeed, the namesake representatives of the Rohrabacher-Farr 
Amendment made the gravity of this shift clear when they were 
faced with potential pushback from some actors in the Department 
of Justice. In a letter to Attorney General Eric Holder addressing 
a potential interpretation of their amendment that would allow 
some medical marijuana prosecutions to continue, Representatives 
Dana Rohrabacher and Sam Farr wrote, “[T]his interpretation of 
our amendment is emphatically wrong.”105 The letter went on to 
tell Holder, “Rest assured, the purpose of [the] amendment was 
to prevent the Department from wasting its limited . . . resources 
on prosecutions . . . against medical marijuana patients and pro-
viders, including businesses that operate legally under state 
law.”106 Lest the Department of Justice was still unsure of where 
the letter’s authors stood, the letter offered additional guidance, 
suggesting that if there happened to be any questions about 
compliance with state law, “state law enforcement agencies are 
best-suited to investigate and determine [if there was a state 
law violation] free from federal interference.”107 In sum, the rep-
resentatives essentially told the Department of Justice that its in-
terpretation of the amendment had no leg to stand on, as the con-
gressional intent was so clear that “[e]ven those who argued against 
the amendment agreed with the proponents’ interpretation.”108 
The executive branch, for its part, has been extremely active 
in the area of marijuana law liberalization. Over the past six 
years, the Department of Justice has issued numerous memos 
and directives to the US attorneys detailing a policy of selective 
enforcement regarding federal marijuana laws. In 2009, Deputy 
Attorney General David W. Ogden issued a memorandum calling 
for federal prosecution of marijuana laws when the offender is not 
“in clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state laws 
 
 104 Osler and Bennett, 7 DePaul J Soc Just at 158 (cited in note 103). See also Fair 
Sentencing Act of 2010 §§ 5–6, 124 Stat at 2373–74. 
 105 Representatives Dana Rohrabacher and Sam Farr, Letter to Attorney General 
Eric Holder *1 (Apr 8, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/P6GE-JPNW. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id at *2. 
 108 Id at *1. 
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providing for the medical use of marijuana” and providing a num-
ber of characteristics that would suggest that an offender is not 
in compliance with state law, such as the presence of unlawful 
firearms or sales to minors.109 The memo says that “the Depart-
ment’s investigative and prosecutorial resources should be di-
rected towards” the “prosecution of significant traffickers of ille-
gal drugs, including marijuana, and the disruption of illegal drug 
manufacturing and trafficking networks,” and that when a poten-
tial offender is in compliance with state laws, she is unlikely to 
fall into these prioritized categories.110 
Four years later, then–Deputy Attorney General James M. 
Cole issued another memo clarifying that if an offender’s conduct 
did not fall into one of a list of “enforcement priorities,” prosecu-
tors should use their discretion to avoid utilizing federal re-
sources to prosecute these marijuana offenders.111 This “2013 
Cole Memo” was clarified in a statement that Cole made to the 
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, in which he stated that the 
Department of Justice was “emphasizing comprehensive regula-
tion and well-funded state enforcement because such a system 
will complement the continued enforcement of state drug laws by 
state and local enforcement officials, in a manner that should al-
lay the threat that a state-sanctioned marijuana operation might 
otherwise pose to federal enforcement interests.”112 Addition-
ally, “the Department notified the Governors of Colorado and 
Washington that we were not at this time seeking to preempt 
their states’ ballot initiatives.”113 
 
 109 David W. Ogden, Memorandum to Selected United States Attorneys on Investiga-
tions and Prosecutions in States Authorizing the Medical Use of Marijuana (Department 
of Justice, Oct 19, 2009), archived at http://perma.cc/HGH2-WPSN (“Ogden Memo”). 
 110 Id. 
 111 See James M. Cole, Memorandum for All United States Attorneys: Guidance re-
garding Marijuana Enforcement *1–3 (Department of Justice, Aug 29, 2013), archived at 
http://perma.cc/4LLA-G98Q (“2013 Cole Memo”). These enforcement priorities are primar-
ily concerned with preventing state marijuana decriminalization from increasing risks to 
public health or serving as a conduit for other crimes. See id at *1–2. Before the 2013 
memo, Cole issued another memo to the US attorneys clarifying that the 2009 Ogden 
Memo referred only to medical marijuana, and states authorizing the large-scale manu-
facturing and sale of marijuana for commercial use were still ripe for prosecution. See 
generally James M. Cole, Memorandum for United States Attorneys: Guidance regarding 
the Ogden Memo in Jurisdictions Seeking to Authorize Marijuana for Medical Use (De-
partment of Justice, June 29, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/K26K-NSMT. 
 112 Statement of James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney General, before the Committee on the 
Judiciary, United States Senate, for a Hearing Entitled “Conflicts between State and Fed-
eral Marijuana Laws” *3 (Department of Justice, Sept 10, 2013), archived at http:// 
perma.cc/XRX5-Z9L6 (“Cole Statement”). 
 113 Id at *2. 
 2122  The University of Chicago Law Review [83:2105 
   
The Department of the Treasury also allayed fears of mari-
juana business owners in a 2014 memo from the Financial 
Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN).114 Prior to the issuance 
of the memo, one of the major hindrances to marijuana-related 
businesses was their inability to use traditional banking services, 
but FinCEN provided guidance to banks on how to provide ser-
vices to these businesses.115 Primarily, this guidance focused on 
the type of due diligence a financial institution should conduct 
on any marijuana-related business it provides services to, as well 
as how to report a marijuana-related business’s suspicious activ-
ity.116 This memo reiterated the 2013 Cole Memo’s enforcement 
priorities and used them as a basis of the guidance to financial 
institutions on identifying and reporting businesses that ap-
peared to run afoul of state law.117 This identification and report-
ing was to be done through the filing of “suspicious activity re-
ports,” which would identify the parties involved in the marijuana 
business, as well as the level of concern the financial institution 
had about that business’s compliance with state and federal law.118 
As the head of the executive branch, President Barack 
Obama has also played a role in ensuring that the enforcement of 
federal drug laws represents a just result. To that end, he has 
used his power of commutation to commute the sentences of nu-
merous nonviolent drug offenders, including marijuana offend-
ers.119 While executive action in this area by the Obama admin-
istration is susceptible to being undone by a future 
administration, that seems unlikely in the marijuana context for 
two reasons. First, the leading candidates remaining in the pres-
idential election as of May 2016 were, at the least, willing to allow 
the states to continue to experiment with marijuana legaliza-
tion.120 As was the case with the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment,121 
this is a noticeably bipartisan issue. Both the Democratic and Re-
publican nominees supported continued state medical and recre-
ational legalization measures.122 The bipartisan support among 
 
 114 See generally BSA Expectations regarding Marijuana-Related Businesses (FinCEN, 
Feb 14, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/TLX7-FGY4. 
 115 See id at *2–3. 
 116 See id at *3–7. 
 117 See id at *1–3. 
 118 BSA Expectations at *3–7 (cited in note 114). 
 119 See Sari Horwitz and Juliet Eilperin, Obama Commutes Sentences of 46 Nonviolent 
Drug Offenders (Wash Post, July 13, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/6PG6-WANL. 
 120 See notes 144–47 and accompanying text. 
 121 See text accompanying notes 97–99, 105–08. 
 122 See notes 144–47 and accompanying text. 
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presidential candidates is matched among politicians more 
broadly, as support for state legalization is part of both parties’ 
efforts toward comprehensive sentencing reform.123 Second, the 
amount of support that marijuana legalization and decriminali-
zation has received from Congress, the judiciary, and the states 
could potentially lessen the impact of a sea change in marijuana 
policy from the executive branch. 
C. The Federal Judiciary and United States v Dayi 
The judiciary has also been active in this area. By providing 
a categorical downward variance from the Guidelines in a large, 
interstate marijuana conspiracy, United States v Dayi124 has 
served as a touchstone for other actors within the realm of crimi-
nal sentencing to begin pushing for further exercises of discretion 
that ensure marijuana crime sentencing reflects a proper analysis 
of the § 3553(a) sentencing factors. 
A foreseeable extension of Booker, Kimbrough, and their 
progeny would be to apply the judicial discretion permitted by 
Booker and the allowance for rational, policy-based disagree-
ments from Kimbrough to other areas of the Guidelines. This is 
exactly what happened in Dayi. Dayi involved a large-scale, inter-
state conspiracy to distribute marijuana featuring twenty-two de-
fendants.125 Judge James K. Bredar expressed two concerns: that 
the Guidelines did not appropriately account for the decreasing 
seriousness of marijuana in the eyes of both the public and the 
federal government, and that the federal government’s selective 
enforcement of marijuana laws could lead to unwarranted sen-
tencing disparities. These concerns were rooted in the sentencing 
factors that Bredar was required to consider by statute—namely, 
§ 3553(a)(2)(A), which calls for a sentence to reflect the serious-
ness of the offense, and § 3553(a)(6), which calls for a sentence to 
 
 123 See, for example, Bill Piper, The Growing Bipartisan Consensus for Rolling Back 
the Failed War on Drugs (Huffington Post, Oct 16, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/C27Y-S62R (discussing Republican-led marijuana-related spending provi-
sions in the House of Representatives and bipartisan sentencing reform bills in the Sen-
ate); Burgess Everett, Bipartisan Marijuana Banking Bill Introduced in the Senate (Politico, 
July 9, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/CC8M-SRK6 (discussing a bipartisan bill intro-
duced in the Senate that would allow marijuana businesses to utilize traditional banking 
services). 
 124 980 F Supp 2d 682 (D Md 2013). 
 125 Id at 683. 
 2124  The University of Chicago Law Review [83:2105 
   
avoid imposing unwarranted sentencing disparities.126 Ulti-
mately, Bredar determined that a two-level reduction in the of-
fense level provided for by the Guidelines was appropriate for 
every defendant involved in the conspiracy.127 This led to a 20 per-
cent to 25 percent reduction in the length of each defendant’s 
sentence.128 
Bredar rested his reasoning on several ideas. First, as with 
the crack Guidelines at issue in Kimbrough, the Commission 
abandoned its usual empirical approach when it first formulated 
the marijuana Guidelines.129 At the time of Dayi, the Commission 
was in the process of using this empirical approach to review the 
accuracy of all of the drug weight–based Guidelines, including 
those for marijuana.130 Second, due to the increasing number of 
states that have legalized or decriminalized marijuana for medic-
inal or recreational purposes, the general seriousness of marijuana-
based crimes has significantly decreased.131 Moreover, the federal 
nonenforcement of marijuana laws for those in compliance with 
state law leads to potentially long custodial sentences for actions 
in some states, with no prosecution for the same actions in oth-
ers.132 Further, the choice to selectively enforce marijuana laws 
suggests that the executive branch does not view marijuana with 
the seriousness that the Guidelines grant it.133 As Bredar noted, 
“[I]f a state were to legalize and regulate heroin—another Sched-
ule I controlled substance—the Justice Department almost cer-
tainly would not respond with a policy of non-enforcement.”134 As 
such, Bredar concluded that, even in the eyes of the people tasked 
with enforcing the federal marijuana laws, the seriousness of the 
offense, a factor that the sentencing judge must account for,135 was 
lessened.136 
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 127 Id at 683–84. 
 128 Dayi, 980 F Supp 2d at 689. 
 129 Id at 684. 
 130 See id at 685 (“[T]he Court takes notice of a recent news release in which the Com-
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 131 Id at 688–89. 
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 135 18 USC § 3553(a)(2)(A). 
 136 Dayi, 980 F Supp 2d at 688 (“The result [of the Justice Department’s nonenforce-
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The sentencing of Bounlith Bouasykeo provides another ex-
ample of the judiciary’s concern regarding this potential issue.137 
In that case, the district court called for argument on whether the 
defendant’s sentencing should be delayed in light of Oregon’s 
then-impending vote on whether to legalize recreational marijuana, 
as well as how the impact of that vote should affect the defend-
ant’s sentence.138 That argument featured extensive analysis of 
Dayi.139 Similarly, multiple defense attorneys have invoked Dayi 
in an attempt to bring this issue to the fore in other district 
courts.140 Additionally, in 2014, the Commission, acting in its role 
as an evaluator of empirical data and national experience, issued 
a call for congressional action to correct the past generation’s 
overly harsh drug sentencing.141 Recognizing that those proposals 
must work their way through the political process, the Commission 
also unilaterally modestly reduced the Guidelines-recommended 
sentence for drug trafficking offenses, and made these reductions 
retroactive.142 This change was estimated to reduce the average 
drug trafficking sentence by approximately 17.7 percent.143 
D. Marijuana in Popular Sentiment 
It has become increasingly clear that to many Americans, in-
cluding politicians, marijuana is not as dangerous as it was once 
thought to be. Many of the presidential candidates, of both the 
Republican and Democratic parties, in the 2016 election espoused 
a willingness to, at the least, allow the states to continue to exper-
iment with marijuana legalization.144 Former Secretary of State 
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Hillary Clinton stated that she was in favor of continuing to allow 
state experimentation, as well as removing marijuana from 
Schedule I in order to facilitate further research.145 Senator Bernie 
Sanders, runner-up in the Democratic primary, echoed Clinton’s 
statements, while adding that owners of marijuana stores should 
have access to traditional banking services like any other busi-
ness and placing his beliefs about marijuana within the broader 
war on drugs.146 Donald Trump, for his part, expressed support 
for medical marijuana and also supported continuing to allow 
state experimentation with marijuana legalization.147 Candidates 
in the 2016 election spoke openly about marijuana reform, and 
reform even began to serve as a differentiator between potentially 
similar candidates.148 
What is even more striking is the level of acceptance that mari-
juana legalization has gained among the American populace. Ac-
cording to a recent Gallup poll, over half (58 percent) of Americans 
support legalization of marijuana,149 including 71 percent of 
adults between the ages of eighteen and thirty-four and 35 per-
cent of adults over the age of sixty-five.150 While seemingly low, 
this latter percentage represents a higher amount of support for 
legalization among seniors than at any previous point that Gallup 
has observed.151 In fact, support for legalization continues to in-
crease. In an AP-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research poll 
using the same question to measure support for legalization as 
the Gallup poll, 61 percent of respondents answered in the affirma-
tive.152 Interestingly, this popular support is notably bipartisan, 
especially among younger generations. The Pew Research Center 
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found that fully 63 percent of Republican millennials and 77 per-
cent of Democratic millennials favored marijuana legalization.153 
Additionally, polling from the Harvard Institute of Politics sug-
gests that, at least among individuals under age thirty, the per-
centages of people strongly supporting and strongly opposing le-
galization are relatively equal, but almost double the amount of 
people “somewhat support” legalization than “somewhat oppose” 
it.154 Indeed, even staunch conservatives, who at one point might 
have been expected to place themselves firmly in the camp for 
prohibition, have begun to embrace “marijuana federalism,” the 
belief that a state should have the right to decide how it will gov-
ern itself on the issue of marijuana.155 
This high level of support for marijuana legalization might be 
a reflection of the large number of people who admit to trying or 
using marijuana. According to a Gallup poll, 11 percent of re-
spondents reported that they currently smoke marijuana and 44 
percent reported that they had tried marijuana at least once.156 
These numbers are the highest reported since Gallup began poll-
ing on the question in 1969, when only 4 percent of respondents 
admitted to trying marijuana.157 Alternately, support for marijuana 
legalization could be a reflection of popular reevaluation of the 
drug’s potential for personal harm when compared to other legal 
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substances, or of more widespread realization of the societal 
harms caused by prohibition.158 
III.  LEARNING FROM HISTORY: HISTORICAL AND MODERN 
ANALOGIES 
This Part explores three analogues to the current regime of 
selective federal enforcement of marijuana laws. Examining the 
history of the crack and powder cocaine Guidelines and the Guide-
lines surrounding possession of child pornography provides fur-
ther examples of instances when Congress and the Commission 
abandoned the Guidelines’ self-proclaimed empirical methodol-
ogy in favor of political expediency. The Fugitive Slave Laws, 
meanwhile, provide a point of comparison to a time when the 
moral and political will of the states was out of sync with that of 
federal politicians. Examining this point in American history il-
luminates both the potential benefits and pitfalls of federal 
nonenforcement. 
Part III.A discusses the history of crack and powder cocaine 
and the sentencing Guidelines surrounding those drugs. 
Part III.B discusses the Guidelines for child pornography posses-
sion and the judicial response to the perceived harshness of those 
Guidelines. Part III.C discusses the Fugitive Slave Laws of 1793 
and 1850. 
A. Crack and Powder Cocaine 
The history of the crack cocaine Guidelines begins with the 
spark set off by a single high-profile drug overdose in 1986. The 
effects of that single event continue on to the present day. Under-
lying all of this history is the steady current of racial disparity. 
This Section discusses the crack cocaine Guidelines, beginning 
with the Supreme Court jurisprudence surrounding them and the 
events that led to their creation, then discussing the aftermath of 
Kimbrough, and finally concluding with a discussion of race’s role 
in the implementation and execution of these Guidelines. 
 
 158 See, for example, German Lopez, A New Report Evaluates Marijuana Legalization 
in Colorado So Far. It’s Mixed News. (Vox, Apr 19, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/L72E 
-R9DA (exploring the balancing act of marijuana legalization, including the potential ben-
efits of additional tax revenue, the reduction of disproportionate harm caused to African 
Americans by marijuana-related contact with the criminal justice system, and the nega-
tive effect on criminal cartels). 
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1. The use and abuse of the sentencing Guidelines through 
Kimbrough. 
Because of the Guidelines’ mandatory nature in the pre-
Booker regime,159 judges were forced to impose sentences that 
were, in their view, wildly disproportionate to the seriousness of 
the offense in cocaine-base160 cases.161 Indeed, courts regularly 
noted that if the defendant before them had the good fortune to 
traffic in powder cocaine instead of crack, her sentence would be 
materially lessened.162 Part of the reason for these exceptionally 
harsh sentences was the relatively small amount of crack needed 
to invoke a mandatory minimum sentence.163 In United States v 
Maske,164 for example, the defendant possessed more than five 
grams of cocaine base, and the district court was therefore unable 
to impose a sentence less than the five-year mandatory minimum. 
If, however, the defendant had been convicted of possessing a sim-
ilar amount of powder cocaine, the maximum sentence would 
have been one year of imprisonment.165 The prevalence of manda-
tory minimum sentences was not the only reason for this harsh-
ness, as the Guidelines’ 100-to-1 ratio, which treated every gram 
of crack as equivalent to one hundred grams of powder cocaine for 
 
 159 See Klein, 39 Valp U L Rev at 699–720 (cited in note 14). 
 160 The Guidelines and statutes that impose mandatory minimum sentences refer to 
cocaine base in their references to crack cocaine. The possible distinctions between cocaine 
base and crack cocaine are immaterial to the purposes of this Comment. The terms cocaine 
base, crack, and crack cocaine are used interchangeably throughout this Comment. 
 161 See Frank O. Bowman III and Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion? Explaining Nearly 
a Decade of Declining Federal Drug Sentences, 86 Iowa L Rev 1043, 1131 n 376 (2001) 
(noting that one district judge “was withdrawing his ‘name . . . [from] the wheel for drug 
cases . . . [because] I simply cannot sentence another impoverished person whose destruc-
tion has no discernible effect on the drug trade’”) (brackets and ellipses in original). See 
also Mark W. Bennett, A Slow Motion Lynching? The War on Drugs, Mass Incarceration, 
Doing Kimbrough Justice, and a Response to Two Third Circuit Judges, 66 Rutgers L Rev 
873, 904–13 (2014); Louis F. Oberdorfer, Mandatory Sentencing: One Judge’s Perspective—
2002, 40 Am Crim L Rev 11, 16–18 (2003) (illustrating Judge Louis F. Oberdorfer’s view 
that “the Guidelines provided that offenses involving crack cocaine were to be treated 
much more severely than offenses involving powder cocaine”); United States v Clary, 846 
F Supp 768, 797 (ED Mo 1994) (finding “that the disproportionate penalties for crack co-
caine as specified in all of the pertinent sections of 21 U.S.C. § 841 violate the Equal Protection 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution generally and as applied in this case”). 
 162 See, for example, United States v Shaw, 936 F2d 412, 414 (9th Cir 1991) (noting 
that the defendants faced a ten-year mandatory minimum if the substance they trafficked 
was cocaine base, but no statutory minimum if the substance was powder cocaine); United 
States v Maske, 840 F Supp 151, 152 n 3 (DDC 1993). 
 163 This issue continued even after Kimbrough. See, for example, United States v Dossie, 
851 F Supp 2d 478, 481–83 (EDNY 2012). 
 164 840 F Supp 151 (DDC 1993). 
 165 Id at 152 n 3. 
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sentencing purposes, meant that the Guidelines had the potential 
to impose sentences far above those mandatory minimums. For ex-
ample, in United States v Barbosa,166 while the statutory mandatory 
minimum sentence set the floor for the defendant at 240 months, the 
Guidelines recommended a sentence of up to 293 months.167 For Luis 
Barbosa, this meant that the Guidelines could cause him to spend 
an extra four years and five months in prison, on top of his statu-
torily mandated twenty-year sentence.168 
The relevant question then becomes: Where did this ratio 
come from? The answer is that the Commission simply adopted 
the congressionally created drug-weight ratio from the 1986 Anti-
Drug Abuse Act.169 Because crack cocaine was relatively new at 
the time of the Act’s creation, and its dangers were perceived to 
be exceptionally potent, Congress chose to adopt a 100-to-1 ratio 
that caused every gram of crack to be treated the same as one 
hundred grams of powder cocaine for the purposes of mandatory 
minimum sentences.170 The Guidelines then adopted this ratio 
wholesale for the full range of sentencing.171 
This ratio was more the result of political posturing than the 
reflection of a reasoned analysis by Congress. Although Congress 
intended for this ratio to punish “major” or “serious” drug deal-
ers,172 the amount of crack needed to trigger lengthy prison sen-
tences was almost comically small. As one report from the ACLU 
 
 166 51 F Supp 2d 597 (ED Pa 1999). 
 167 Id at 599–600 (noting that the defendant faced either the 240-month statutory 
minimum or a sentence of 240 to 293 months under the Guidelines). Interestingly, Barbosa 
could have been convicted of trafficking an equal amount of either powder cocaine or crack 
cocaine (depending on how the court decided to classify the substance he possessed). While 
the Guidelines recommended up to 293 months for the crack conviction, the maximum 
recommended length of imprisonment for the powder cocaine conviction was only 97 
months. Stated differently, the Guidelines recommended more than 16 years of additional 
imprisonment for a conviction for trafficking crack instead of powder cocaine. Id. 
 168 Id. 
 169 See Kimbrough, 552 US at 96. 
 170 Id at 95–96. 
 171 Id at 96–97 (explaining how the Guidelines tied the potential range of sentences 
to drug weights, which ranged from “less than 250 milligrams of crack (or 25 grams of 
powder)” at a minimum to “more than 1.5 kilograms of crack (or 150 kilograms of powder)” 
at a maximum). See also USSG § 2D1.1(c). 
 172 Deborah J. Vagins and Jesselyn McCurdy, Cracks in the System: Twenty Years of 
the Unjust Federal Crack Cocaine Law *2 (ACLU, Oct 2006), archived at 
http://perma.cc/6T2Z-WP9S. See also Report to the Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentenc-
ing Policy *6–7 (United States Sentencing Commission, May 2002), archived at http:// 
perma.cc/6QXZ-ZBMJ (“2002 USSC Cocaine Sentencing Report”) (noting that Senator 
Robert Byrd stated that the ten-year mandatory minimum sentence was intended for 
“kingpins” and the five-year mandatory minimum was intended for “middle-level deal-
ers”); id at *6 n 20 (noting that a number of congresspersons expressed concern that the 
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noted, someone with an amount of crack equal to “the weight of 
two pennies” (five grams) would be “sentenced to at least five 
years imprisonment,” and someone with a candy bar’s weight in 
crack (fifty grams) would be sentenced to at least ten years.173 As 
the Court noted in Kimbrough: 
Congress apparently believed that crack was significantly 
more dangerous than powder cocaine in that: (1) crack was 
highly addictive; (2) crack users and dealers were more likely 
to be violent than users and dealers of other drugs; (3) crack 
was more harmful to users than powder, particularly for chil-
dren who had been exposed by their mothers’ drug use during 
pregnancy; (4) crack use was especially prevalent among 
teenagers; and (5) crack’s potency and low cost were making 
it increasingly popular.174 
These were perfectly rational reasons to believe that crack needed 
to be punished more harshly than powder cocaine, but by the mid-
1990s, it was clear that they were almost all definitively incorrect.175 
The relative harmfulness of crack (including to the infamous pre-
natal “crack babies”176), the potential spread of its popularity, and 
the violence associated with its sale and use were all previously 
overstated.177 In spite of the Commission’s recognition of its origi-
nal fault and recommendation for change,178 Congress did not 
adopt a lower ratio until 2010.179 
 
bill was being passed in haste or without adequate consideration because of an upcoming 
election). 
 173 See Vagins and McCurdy, Cracks in the System at *2 (cited in note 172). 
 174 Kimbrough, 552 US at 95–96, citing 2002 USSC Cocaine Sentencing Report at *90 
(cited in note 172). 
 175 Kimbrough, 552 US at 97–98 (noting that the Commission later realized that the 
relative harmfulness of the two drugs was not supported by experience, that the crack–
powder disparity was inconsistent with the 1986 Act’s goal of punishing major traffickers, 
who mostly deal with powder cocaine, and that the discrepancy “fosters disrespect for and 
lack of confidence in the criminal justice system”). 
 176 See id at 98 (“[The Commission] also observed that the negative effects of prenatal 
crack cocaine exposure are identical to the negative effects of prenatal powder cocaine 
exposure.”) (quotation marks omitted). 
 177 Id at 97–98. See also generally 2002 USSC Cocaine Sentencing Report (cited in 
note 172); Report to the Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy (United States 
Sentencing Commission, May 2007), archived at http://perma.cc/CX2D-BPAP (“2007 
USSC Cocaine Sentencing Report”). 
 178 See Kimbrough, 552 US at 97, quoting 2002 USSC Cocaine Sentencing Report at 
*91 (cited in note 172) (“Based on additional research and experience with the 100-to-1 
ratio, the Commission concluded that the disparity ‘fails to meet the sentencing objectives 
set forth by Congress in both the Sentencing Reform Act and the 1986 Act.’”). 
 179 See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 § 2, 124 Stat at 2372, codified at 21 USC § 841. 
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Although Kimbrough discussed how Congress failed in creat-
ing the 100-to-1 ratio, that case did not afford adequate attention 
to why those failures occurred. Namely, Kimbrough did not afford 
adequate attention to the role that popular fear played in the de-
piction of crack’s seriousness. Failing to discuss this part of the 
origins of the 1986 Act, and the drug Guidelines that it spawned, 
leads to an incomplete picture of the problems it created and in-
creases the probability that future solutions will not grapple with 
all of the problem’s underlying causes. 
Most notably, House Speaker Thomas “Tip” O’Neill, whose 
district included the city of Boston, heavily pushed for the 1986 
Act.180 That O’Neill represented Boston is significant because, in 
the summer of 1986, Len Bias, a black man who had recently been 
drafted by the NBA’s Boston Celtics, died of what was assumed 
to be a crack overdose.181 His actual cause of death, however, was 
an overdose on powder cocaine.182 This death caused O’Neill to 
“ma[ke] passing a new drug statute a priority.”183 Invigorated by 
Congress’s desire to appear tough on crime in an election year, 
the “law was pushed through just a few weeks before the 1986 
Congressional elections.”184 As one New York Times piece noted, 
the effort to pass the bill was bipartisan, and “[t]he spectacle of 
the month in Washington [was] the Gadarene rush of politicians 
to the drug issue. Democrats in the House of Representatives vied 
with President Reagan and his followers for the most ferocious 
posture in the crusade against drugs.”185 This confluence of factors 
can be seen in the 1986 Act’s rushed passage: 
The Controlled Substances Act sentencing provisions were 
initiated in the House Subcommittee on Crime in early Au-
gust 1986 in a climate in the Congress that some have char-
acterized as frenzied. Speaker O’Neill returned from Boston 
after the July 4th district work period where he had been 
 
 180 Osler and Bennett, 7 DePaul J Soc Just at 131–33 (cited in note 103). See also 
generally Adam M. Acosta, Comment, Len Bias’ Death Still Haunts Crack-Cocaine Offend-
ers after Twenty Years: Failing to Reduce Disproportionate Crack-Cocaine Sentences under 
18 U.S.C. § 3582, 53 Howard L J 825 (2010). 
 181 Osler and Bennett, 7 DePaul J Soc Just at 131–32 (cited in note 103). 
 182 Id at 132. 
 183 LaJuana Davis, Rock, Powder, Sentencing—Making Disparate Impact Evidence 
Relevant in Crack Cocaine Sentencing, 14 J Gender, Race & Just 375, 381–82 (2011). 
 184 Osler and Bennett, 7 DePaul J Soc Just at 131 (cited in note 103). 
 185 Anthony Lewis, The Political Narcotic (NY Times, Sept 29, 1986), online at 
http://www.nytimes.com/1986/09/29/opinion/abroad-at-home-the-political-narcotic.html 
(visited Nov 22, 2015) (Perma archive unavailable). 
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bombarded with constituent horror and outrage about the co-
caine overdose death of NCAA basketball star Len Bias after 
signing with the championship Boston Celtics. The Speaker 
announced that the House Democrats would develop an om-
nibus anti-drug bill, easing the reelection concerns of many 
Democratic members of the House, by ostensibly preempting 
the crime and drug issue from the Republicans who had used 
it very effectively in the 1984 election season. . . . For this 
omnibus bill much of [the typical congressional] procedure 
was dispensed with. The careful deliberative practices of the 
Congress were set aside for the drug bill.186 
The rushed timeline for this bill suggests not only that the likeli-
hood for unforeseen effects was increased, but also that the moti-
vations of the members pushing it through were not merely solv-
ing a problem, but also achieving a political “win” in time for an 
election. 
2. Kimbrough’s aftermath. 
Kimbrough and its progeny stand for the idea that a sentenc-
ing judge’s differing policy belief from the Commission can allow 
that judge to deviate from the Guidelines even in a seemingly 
mine-run case.187 Kimbrough is particularly notable here because 
the Court differentiated the crack cocaine recommendations as 
they were not a reflection of the Commission’s characteristic ap-
proach of basing recommendations on empirical data and national 
experience.188 Instead, the Commission simply adopted the 1986 
Act’s mandatory minimum sentences as its guidepost.189 Because 
the Commission twice used its empirical methodology to propose 
substantial changes to the ratio, and Congress acquiesced to one 
set of these changes, the Court argued that it would be eminently 
reasonable for a district court to further deviate from this portion 
of the Guidelines.190 Indeed, the crack ratio cases might best be 
understood to stand for the principle that the sentencing factors 
 
 186 William Spade Jr, Beyond the 100:1 Ratio: Towards a Rational Cocaine Sentencing 
Policy, 38 Ariz L Rev 1233, 1250 (1996) (brackets omitted) (quoting the testimony of Eric 
E. Sterling, president of the Criminal Justice Policy Foundation, at a 1993 hearing before 
the Commission). 
 187 See Kimbrough, 552 US at 109–10. 
 188 Id at 109. 
 189 Id. 
 190 Id at 105–06. 
 2134  The University of Chicago Law Review [83:2105 
   
enunciated by § 3553(a) should be the ultimate touchstone for dis-
trict courts. Because those factors are statutory, judges are bound 
to apply them faithfully. When the Guidelines conflict with a 
faithful application of § 3553(a) to a particular defendant, vari-
ance from the Guidelines is not only warranted, it is necessary.191 
In 2010, Congress and the Commission implemented an 18-
to-1 crack–powder cocaine ratio.192 Judge Mark W. Bennett of the 
Northern District of Iowa, however, has posited that this updated 
ratio does not go far enough and, like the original 100-to-1 ratio, 
is more the result of political compromise than the reasoned em-
pirical analysis reflecting the § 3553(a) sentencing factors that 
the Commission purports to undertake.193 For these reasons, in 
United States v Williams,194 Bennett continued to utilize a 1-to-1 
ratio.195 After he originally adopted this ratio in United States v 
Gully,196 a number of other judges followed suit.197 
3. Race. 
As the Court noted in Kimbrough, the brunt of the 100-to-1 
crack ratio Guidelines fell on the shoulders of African Americans, 
as “[a]pproximately 85 percent of defendants convicted of crack 
offenses in federal court are black.”198 In its reasoning for why a 
district court might deviate from the ratio in a mine-run case, the 
Court approvingly quoted a Commission report that “stated that 
the crack/powder sentencing differential ‘fosters disrespect for 
and lack of confidence in the criminal justice system’ because of a 
‘widely-held perception’ that it ‘promotes unwarranted disparity 
based on race.’”199 Similarly, Congress’s belief that “crack users 
and dealers were more likely to be violent than users and dealers 
 
 191 See 18 USC § 3553(a) (mandating that “[t]he court shall impose a sentence suffi-
cient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in para-
graph (2) of this subsection”) (emphasis added). 
 192 Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 § 2, 124 Stat at 2372, codified at 21 USC § 841. 
 193 See United States v Williams, 788 F Supp 2d 847, 855–56 (ND Iowa 2011). 
 194 788 F Supp 2d 847 (ND Iowa 2011). 
 195 Id at 891–92. 
 196 619 F Supp 2d 633, 644 (ND Iowa 2009). 
 197 See United States v Whigham, 754 F Supp 2d 239, 245–47 (D Mass 2010) (Gertner) 
(applying a 1-to-1 ratio); United States v Lewis, 623 F Supp 2d 42, 45–47 (DDC 2009) 
(Friedman) (same). See also United States v Shull, 793 F Supp 2d 1048, 1064 (SD Ohio 
2011) (Marbley) (opining that the mandatory minimum sentence forbade the sentencing 
judge from applying the sentence that a 1-to-1 ratio would call for); United States v Parker, 
2015 WL 10527259, *15 n 13 (D Vt) (noting that the chief judge of the district recently 
announced that the court would not abide by the 18-to-1 ratio). 
 198 Kimbrough, 552 US at 98. 
 199 Id, quoting 2002 USSC Cocaine Sentencing Report at *103 (cited in note 172). 
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of other drugs” and that “crack was more harmful to users than 
powder, particularly for children who had been exposed by their 
mothers’ drug use during pregnancy”200 comports with long-standing 
negative stereotypes of African Americans as violent and as irre-
sponsible parents.201 That Congress fell prey to these stereotypes 
is less surprising when considering the rush to pass the 1986 Act 
to appear tough on crime in an election year.202 These fears, pre-
dictably, proved to be largely unfounded.203 
The role that race played in the implementation and refor-
mation of the crack cocaine Guidelines cannot be overstated. As 
Michael Gelacak, vice chairman of the Commission, stated in a 
report to Congress, “The perception of unfairness [caused by the 
100-to-1 ratio] is a very real problem. Black Americans know that 
the penalties for crack cocaine fall primarily upon the youth of 
their communities and they do not countenance the present pen-
alty structure.”204 Gelacak analogized the ratio to “punishing ve-
hicular homicide while under the influence of alcohol more se-
verely if the defendant had become intoxicated by ingesting cheap 
wine rather than scotch whiskey,” noting how “[t]hat suggestion 
is absurd on its face and ought be no less so when the abused sub-
stance is cocaine rather than alcohol.”205 Importantly, Gelacak 
recognized the political realities of this issue. Engaging with the 
racial realities of the ratio’s impact would “elevate[ ] . . . the polit-
ical consequences” of the issue, and shifting the ratio, and thus 
lowering sentences for some offenders, might cause politicians to 
be “labeled soft on crime.”206 In spite of these risks, Gelacak be-
lieved that justice required the change. Not only did “the public 
and various law enforcement officials and personnel acknowledge 
there is a problem,” but the potential ramifications of the problem 
 
 200 Kimbrough, 552 US at 95–96. 
 201 For a particularly virulent example of these and many other negative stereotypes 
of African Americans, see The Birth of a Nation (David W. Griffith Corp 1915) (opining, 
by quoting President Woodrow Wilson, that “the negroes were the office holders, men who 
knew none of the uses of authority, except its insolences”). 
 202 See Vagins and McCurdy, Cracks in the System at *i (cited in note 172) (describing 
the rushed passage of the 1986 Act and the “extremely arbitrary” racialized sentencing 
disparities it created). 
 203 See generally id. See also Kimbrough, 552 US at 97–98. 
 204 Concurring Opinion of Vice Chairman Michael S. Gelacak *3, in Special Report to 
the Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy (United States Sentencing Commis-
sion, Apr 1997), archived at http://perma.cc/NH5W-SR27 (“Gelacak Opinion”). 
 205 Id at *2. 
 206 Id at *3–4 (quotation marks omitted). 
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extended beyond the traditional court of public opinion.207 Gelacak 
noted bluntly: 
Bad laws weaken respect of good laws. Consequences follow. 
Sooner or later all those people who feel alienated as a result 
of receiving what they believe to be unfair treatment and un-
just sentences will be released from jail. Does this country 
really expect them to become productive members of society 
or might we anticipate some retributive behavior?208 
In conclusion, Gelacak wrote that because of the vast and un-
warranted racial disparities, “I believe strongly that the disparity 
between penalties for the same quantities of crack and powder 
cocaine is wrong.”209 Although the Commission found “no evidence 
of racial bias behind the promulgation of this federal sentencing 
law,” the fact remained that “nearly 90 percent of the offenders 
convicted in federal court for crack cocaine distribution are African-
American while the majority of crack cocaine users is white.”210 
This disturbing fact raises an even more disturbing question: Had 
this massive, disparate, and severe impact not fallen on African 
Americans, a historically politically disenfranchised group, but on 
the majority white population, would it ever have happened? 
While there may never be a definitive answer to this question, the 
response to the recent outbreak of heroin use suggests that the 
answer is no.211 
 
 207 Id at *4. 
 208 Gelacak Opinion at *4–5 (cited in note 204). 
 209 Id at *5. 
 210 Special Report to the Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy *8 (United 
States Sentencing Commission, Apr 1997), archived at http://perma.cc/M97B-F75Q (“1997 
USSC Cocaine Sentencing Report”). 
 211 See Clyde Haberman, Heroin, Survivor of War on Drugs, Returns with New Face 
(NY Times, Nov 22, 2015), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/23/us/heroin 
-survivor-of-war-on-drugs-returns-with-new-face.html (visited June 6, 2016) (Perma ar-
chive unavailable) (discussing the recent heroin epidemic and its primarily white user 
base, and noting how “compassion is the ascendant spirit” in the response to heroin’s rise); 
Katharine Q. Seelye, In Heroin Crisis, White Families Seek Gentler War on Drugs (NY 
Times, Oct 30, 2015), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/31/us/heroin-war-on 
-drugs-parents.html (visited June 6, 2016) (Perma archive unavailable) (“‘Because the de-
mographic of people affected [by the heroin epidemic] are more white, more middle class, 
these are parents who are empowered,’ said Michael Botticelli, . . . the nation’s drug czar. 
‘They know how to call a legislator, they know how to get angry with their insurance com-
pany, they know how to advocate.’”). 
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B. Deviating from the Child Pornography Possession 
Guidelines 
As in the war on drugs, the Guidelines addressing the posses-
sion of child pornography do not appear to reflect the Commis-
sion’s empirically calculated proxy for a reasoned application of 
the § 3553(a) factors.212 It is thus unsurprising that a number of 
judges have begun varying from the Guidelines’ recommenda-
tions for child pornography possession, just as they previously did 
with the crack cocaine Guidelines.213 
As explained in United States v Hanson,214 the Guidelines for 
some child pornography offenses do not reflect the Commission’s 
typical role of performing empirical studies.215 Instead, Congress 
has directly increased the harshness of the child pornography 
possession Guidelines, even as the Commission has suggested 
that the length of these sentences should be decreased.216 Because 
of this, the Guidelines might suggest a sentence near the statu-
tory maximum, or even an impossible sentence above that maxi-
mum, for a typical possessor of child pornography.217 
Hanson’s facts demonstrate this phenomenon. Jon Hanson 
had no prior criminal record.218 Outwardly, he appeared to be an 
upstanding business owner and family man, but secretly he pos-
sessed a large collection of child pornography and participated in 
online chat rooms about child pornography.219 Through numerous 
enhancements to his Guidelines range, Hanson’s recommended 
sentence called for between 210 months and 262 months impris-
onment.220 These enhancements were required because Hanson 
used a computer to access child pornography; possessed images of 
a child under the age of twelve; compiled a collection of hundreds 
 
 212 See United States v Hanson, 561 F Supp 2d 1004, 1008–12 (ED Wis 2008) (discuss-
ing the history of child pornography in the Guidelines). 
 213 See, for example, United States v Grober, 624 F3d 592, 608–09 (3d Cir 2010); 
United States v Dorvee, 616 F3d 174, 182–88 (2d Cir 2010); Hanson, 561 F Supp 2d at 
1011–12; United States v Johnson, 588 F Supp 2d 997, 1002–07 (SD Iowa 2008). See also 
Arlen Specter and Linda Dale Hoffa, A Quiet but Growing Judicial Rebellion against 
Harsh Sentences for Child Pornography Offenses—Should the Laws Be Changed?, The 
Champion 12, 13 (Oct 2011). 
 214 561 F Supp 2d 1004 (ED Wis 2008). 
 215 See id at 1009 (discussing USSG § 2G2.2). 
 216 See id at 1009–10 (noting that, in spite of the Commission’s recommendations, 
“Congress has repeatedly amended [this portion of the Guidelines] directly”). 
 217 See id at 1010–11. 
 218 Hanson, 561 F Supp 2d at 1011. 
 219 See id at 1007–09. 
 220 See id at 1006. 
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of images; traded images for a “thing of value,” which is defined 
to include trading for other images of child pornography (Hanson 
did not attempt to sell any child pornography); and possessed a 
portrayal of sadistic conduct, an enhancement that applied 
whether Hanson intended to possess those particularly sadistic 
images or not.221 
While child pornography is clearly heinous and causes great 
harm,222 it is important to note that, for the crime Hanson was 
charged with, Congress mandated a sentence of between five and 
twenty years imprisonment,223 but these enhancements resulted 
in a Guidelines-recommended sentence potentially longer than 
that maximum. This is especially problematic because many of 
Hanson’s enhancements either had nothing to do with his own 
culpability, such as the enhancement for sadistic imagery,224 or 
are typical of any modern child pornography offense.225 In the In-
ternet age, amassing a collection of hundreds of images could be 
as simple as spending a few hours on a file transfer site like that 
used by Hanson. It is similarly unsurprising that chat room par-
ticipants would engage in trades, and Hanson’s use of a computer 
to access the images is unexceptional in light of the fact that com-
puters are now the primary tool for accessing any type of infor-
mation.226 Indeed, in light of Hanson’s own history of being sex-
ually abused, and his subsequent alcohol abuse and addiction,227 
a theory of justice focused around rehabilitation, as opposed to 
retribution, might argue that, instead of significant jail time, 
Hanson should have received substantial counseling. In fact, 
Hanson did undergo significant sex-offender counseling and be-
gan participating in Alcoholics Anonymous.228 These factors con-
vinced the district court to give him a sentence near the statutory 
minimum.229 Hanson is an excellent example of § 3553(a) in ac-
tion. By recognizing Hanson’s mitigating characteristics, as called 
 
 221 Id at 1006, 1009. 
 222 See Audrey Rogers, Child Pornography’s Forgotten Victims, 28 Pace L Rev 847, 
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 223 Hanson, 561 F Supp 2d at 1005. 
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 225 See id at 1010. 
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for by § 3553(a)(1) and § 3553(a)(2), the court ensured that the 
statutory requirement that a sentence be “sufficient, but not 
greater than necessary,”230 was fulfilled. 
Hanson is not a case of one rogue judge taking pity on a sym-
pathetic defendant. According to one survey of the case law, at 
least fifteen separate cases have taken a downward departure 
from the child pornography possession sentences recommended 
by the Guidelines.231 The Commission’s own data is even more 
telling. In the period between 2007 and 2011, 44 percent of child 
pornography nonproduction offenses resulted in a sentence below 
the Guidelines range, with an average reduction of 40.4 percent.232 
Commentators, too, have noted that there is a widespread judicial 
rebellion against this portion of the Guidelines.233 
While lengthy child pornography possession sentences can be 
justified by societal opprobrium for those offenders, it is more dif-
ficult to argue that the recently increased child pornography sen-
tences reflect increasing societal disapproval. Without this in-
creasing level of disapproval, or some other new information 
suggesting that child pornography possession is causing previ-
ously unforeseen harm, the increases that have occurred in 
Guidelines sentences appear to reflect not the empirical ethos of 
the Commission, but the political will of Congress. Furthermore, 
other justifications for increased punishment are unconvincing. 
For example, increased punishment’s ability to either deter fu-
ture child sexual abuse or punish undetected past abuse is unsup-
ported by empirical research.234 
These increased sentences have reached the point of absurdity, 
resulting in cases in which possessors of child pornography are 
punished more harshly than someone who physically sexually as-
saulted a child.235 Even if the belief that all possessors of child 
pornography wish to sexually assault children is accepted as true, 
this convergence in the length of sentences between possession 
and assault is illogical. If this possession-assault reasoning was 
actually motivating the increase in child pornography possession 
 
 230 18 USC § 3553(a). 
 231 See United States v Diaz, 720 F Supp 2d 1039, 1041–42 (ED Wis 2010). 
 232 Analysis of Child Pornography Offenses *114, archived at http://perma.cc/H7GE-CPX8. 
 233 See generally Specter and Hoffa, The Champion 12 (cited in note 213); Marcia G. 
Shein, The Changing Landscape of Sentencing Mitigation in Possession of Child Pornog-
raphy Cases, The Champion 32 (May 2011); Melissa Hamilton, Sentencing Adjudication: 
Lessons from Child Pornography Policy Nullification, 30 Ga St U L Rev 375 (2014). 
 234 See Hessick, 88 Wash U L Rev at 864–86 (cited in note 226). 
 235 Id at 861. 
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sentences, Congress should also have sought to increase the 
length of child sexual assault sentences to maintain marginal de-
terrence on assault crimes. Without that level of marginal deter-
rence, a potential perpetrator of assault choosing between pos-
sessing or watching child pornography and physically assaulting 
a child does not have a reason not to make the latter, potentially 
more devastating choice.236 In light of all this, it seems that a 
likely explanation for these harsh and seemingly inexplicable sen-
tences is the same as that in the crack ratio context. Congress, in 
attempting to respond to the real problem of increased access to 
child pornography on the Internet, abandoned a reasoned appli-
cation of the available empirical data in an effort to be tough on a 
morally repugnant crime.237 In doing so, they unnecessarily 
harmed a politically despised class (pedophiles) without reflecting 
on whether their methods would actually solve the relevant prob-
lem.238 The crack, marijuana, and child pornography Guidelines 
suggest that Congress sees these criminal problems as nails, and 
so they use the politically popular hammer of harsh sentences.239 
Because Congress has, at times, indiscriminately and im-
properly addressed problems by increasing the harshness of sen-
tences, the judiciary has used its discretion to correct the ensuing 
injustice. It is perhaps unsurprising that sentencing judges have 
decided that possessors of child pornography are notably less de-
serving of lengthy prison sentences than perpetrators of child sex-
ual assault. This is so because sentencing judges must interact 
 
 236 See id at 865–80 (presenting and rebutting the arguments that child pornography 
either is or leads to child sexual abuse). It is possible that Congress believed that increas-
ing the Guidelines for child pornography possession would increase deterrence of the 
crime, as the Internet has greatly increased the proliferation of child pornography while 
making possessors potentially more difficult to catch. While this possibility is logically 
defensible, it is telling that the increase was not based on a recommendation by the Com-
mission in its empirical role, and that it has been rebuked by sentencing judges. 
 237 See id at 866 (noting a statement cited in congressional hearings that child por-
nography was “worse than murder”); id at 882 & n 120 (citing congressional statements 
that equate possessors of child pornography with child predators who commit contact offenses). 
 238 See Amir Efrati, Making Punishments Fit the Most Offensive Crimes (Wall St J, 
Oct 23, 2008), online at http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122471925786760689 (visited Mar 
28, 2016) (Perma archive unavailable) (noting a similar argument that the increased sen-
tences often defy explanation). 
 239 See Cheyenne Morales Harty, The Causes and Effects of Get Tough: A Look at How 
Tough-on-Crime Policies Rose to the Agenda and an Examination of Their Effects on Prison 
Populations and Crime *4–57 (unpublished graduate thesis, University of South Florida, 
Jan 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/997X-9M7H (discussing several theoretical expla-
nations for why politicians might be tough on crime before utilizing those theories to de-
scribe how tough-on-crime policies drove sentencing reform efforts in the last decades of 
the twentieth century). 
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with various criminal defendants on an individual level and must 
evaluate the totality of the circumstances of these defendants’ 
lives.240 The feedback from this on the ground perspective was an-
ticipated and expected in the Commission’s formulation of the 
Guidelines,241 and is necessary to ensure that the Guidelines con-
tinue to reflect the § 3553 sentencing factors. 
C. Conflicts of State and Federal Law: The Fugitive Slave 
Laws 
The Fugitive Slave Laws of 1793 and 1850 serve as helpful 
examples of another time in American history when federal law 
was powerfully at odds with both state laws and the personal be-
liefs of much of the populace. The moral starkness of the issue of 
slavery, as well as our temporal distance from that experience, 
might help to elucidate principles that also are relevant to child 
pornography and drug sentencing, but are obscured by the imme-
diacy and political realities of those issues. 
The Fugitive Slave Laws served one primary purpose: to re-
turn escaped enslaved persons living in states that disallowed 
slavery back to their “owners” in states that allowed slavery.242 
These laws aided the continued survival of the institution of slav-
ery in those states where it was legal. Naturally, the populations 
of states where slavery was illegal often wanted no part in return-
ing those fortunate enough to escape slavery’s clutches to their 
former masters.243 One way that states chose to counter these fed-
eral laws was with the passage of so-called personal liberty 
 
 240 It is this logic—that personal interaction leads to better understanding of people 
representing different groups—that underlies the push for school integration. See, for ex-
ample, Alana Semuels, The City That Believed in Desegregation (The Atlantic, Mar 27, 
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/UTX5-G786 (discussing Louisville, Kentucky’s reasons 
for continuing down the difficult path of integrating its public schools).  
 241 See USSG § 1A1.2. 
 242 See Allen Johnson, The Constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Acts, 31 Yale L J 
161, 164 (1921) (discussing the purpose of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793); Emmett D. 
Preston, The Fugitive Slave Acts in Ohio, 28 J Negro Hist 422, 429–32 (1943) (discussing 
the purpose, effect, and passage of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850). 
 243 See Paul Finkelman, Legal Ethics and Fugitive Slaves: The Anthony Burns Case, 
Judge Loring, and Abolitionist Attorneys, 17 Cardozo L Rev 1793, 1798–99 (1996) (noting 
Northerners’ willingness to resort to extralegal means to prevent the recapture of enslaved 
persons, including the history of the attempt to prevent the return of formerly enslaved 
person Anthony Burns to slavery). Of course, not every resident of the Northern states 
was a staunch abolitionist willing to raise arms to prevent the return of an escaped en-
slaved person, but there were enough such people to cause major obstruction to the Fugitive 
Slave Laws. See generally id. 
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laws.244 These laws were enabled by Prigg v Pennsylvania,245 
which noted that states could prohibit their magistrates from ex-
ercising authority under the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793 by stat-
ute, thus providing the states with a guideline for how to blunt 
the effectiveness of the law.246 Through a variety of tactics, these 
personal liberty laws effectively “closed [Northern states’] jails 
and courtrooms to slave catchers.”247 For example, after a promi-
nent, and ultimately failed, attempt by one slave owner to re-
trieve an escaped enslaved person,248 Massachusetts passed an 
act that “prohibited state judges from hearing fugitive slave cases 
and barred state officers from arresting or incarcerating fugitive 
slaves.”249 These laws, in coordination with resistance by the pop-
ulace, effectively ensured that the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793 
went unenforced in many states.250 
These personal liberty laws are analogous to the states’ pas-
sage of laws legalizing marijuana in the medical and recreational 
contexts. The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution clearly al-
lows federal slave (or drug) laws to trump whatever the states 
 
 244 See, for example, Act of March 25, 1826, 1825 Pa Laws 150; Of the Writ of Habeas 
Corpus, to Bring Up a Person to Testify, or to Answer in Certain Cases, 2 NY Rev Stat 559 
(1829); An Act to Restore the Trial by Jury, on Questions of Personal Freedom, 1837 Mass 
Laws 240 (requiring a jury trial in order for slave owners, or their agents, to reclaim the 
persons they claimed were escaped slaves). See also Finkelman, 17 Cardozo L Rev at 1797–
99, 1801–02 (cited in note 243) (discussing the passage of “personal liberty laws” ostensibly 
designed to protect free blacks from kidnapping, which had the additional purpose of cir-
cumventing federal fugitive slave laws and preventing the return of escaped enslaved per-
sons to the South, and also examining the Fugitive Slave Laws’ implications for competing 
notions of law and justice); James A. Kraehenbuehl, Comment, Lessons from the Past: How 
the Antebellum Fugitive Slave Debate Informs State Enforcement of Federal Immigration 
Law, 78 U Chi L Rev 1465, 1474 n 46 (2011). See also generally Thomas D. Morris, Free 
Men All: The Personal Liberty Laws of the North 1780-1861 (Johns Hopkins 1974). Citizens 
of states that disallowed slavery would also use extralegal means to prevent the return of 
formerly enslaved persons to slavery or would pressure Southerners pressing a claim to 
sell at a below-market price. See Finkelman, 17 Cardozo L Rev at 1798–99 (cited in note 243). 
 245 41 US (16 Pet) 539 (1842). 
 246 See id at 625–26 (holding the Pennsylvania act intended to protect free blacks from 
kidnapping, as well as effectively preventing slave catchers from operating within the 
state, to be unconstitutional, while maintaining that states may prohibit magistrates from 
exercising authority under the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793 by statute). 
 247 Finkelman, 17 Cardozo L Rev at 1799 (cited in note 243). 
 248 See generally Commonwealth v Tracy, 46 Mass 536 (1843). 
 249 Finkelman, 17 Cardozo L Rev at 1799 (cited in note 243). 
 250 See id at 1797–99. It should be noted that these personal liberty laws also served 
the important purpose of attempting to ensure that free African Americans were not kid-
napped and taken into slavery by slave catchers. Id at 1797. See also Morris, Free Men All 
at xi (cited in note 244) (noting that “[n]early all the states above the Mason-Dixon line 
experimented at one time or another with such laws (the only exceptions are Illinois and 
the far western states that came into the Union in the 1850s)”). 
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may do,251 but states often take advantage of whatever leeway the 
federal government allows them in an effort to enact laws that 
match the will of their constituencies. While this tension ulti-
mately led to the clash between North and South in the slavery 
context, there is much more unity of purpose in the context of 
drug reforms, and especially marijuana reforms. State passage of 
medical and recreational marijuana laws may be in direct conflict 
with federal law, but all three branches of the federal government 
have shown a willingness to allow the states to pursue their own 
aims, as well as a willingness to lend support to the states to en-
sure the success of their experiments.252 
The Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 provides an example of how 
strict federal enforcement in opposition to the will of the states 
and their citizenry might end poorly. That law came about as part 
of the Compromise of 1850,253 an attempt to appease the South 
and keep the Union together.254 To ensure enforcement, the Fugitive 
Slave Law of 1850 provided harsh penalties for anyone attempt-
ing to interfere with the recapture of an enslaved person and pro-
hibited trials on the right of the alleged enslaved person to her 
freedom; “the whole tenor of the law was corrupt.”255 Further, the 
law “penalized opponents of slavery, mocked due process, under-
mined the independence of those authorized to enforce the law, 
and, worst of all, made Northerners into slave catchers.”256 
In light of the fierce opposition to slavery in parts of the 
North,257 it is perhaps unsurprising that this law helped to in-
crease the rift between North and South in the years immediately 
preceding the Civil War. While it is obvious that the Fugitive 
Slave Laws had a destructive impact on African Americans, the 
full extent of the political branches’ willingness to forego the 
safety and liberty of both free and enslaved African Americans is 
 
 251 See US Const Art VI, cl 2. 
 252 See Part II. 
 253 See Paul Finkelman, States’ Rights, Southern Hypocrisy, and the Crisis of the Union, 
45 Akron L Rev 449, 456–61 (2012). 
 254 See Finkelman, 17 Cardozo L Rev at 1800–02 (cited in note 243). 
 255 Id. 
 256 Id. 
 257 See, for example, Commonwealth v Aves, 35 Mass 193, 202 (1836) (holding that 
although federal law recognized slavery, as did the laws of the master’s home state, a slave 
brought into the state of Massachusetts could not then be forced to return to slavery, in 
part because slavery “offends [the people of Massachusetts’s] morals, [ ] contravenes their 
policy, . . . [and] offers a pernicious example”). See also Finkelman, 17 Cardozo L Rev at 
1832–34 (cited in note 243) (discussing the ostracization of Edward Greely Loring, a North-
ern judge who chose to enforce the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850). 
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not as immediately apparent. During the regime of the Fugitive 
Slave Law of 1793, personal liberty laws not only served the pur-
pose of circumventing the Fugitive Slave Law, but also attempted 
to protect free African Americans from kidnapping by slave catch-
ers acting under the guise of the law.258 The Fugitive Slave Law 
of 1850’s draconian policies, by contrast, sacrificed the security 
and rights of free African Americans, as well as any potential that 
an enslaved person might reclaim her freedom by escaping to the 
nonslave states, in favor of the white political establishment’s in-
terest in appeasing the Southern states.259 
These laws suggest that the political willingness to dispro-
portionately burden either racial minorities or other politically 
unpopular or powerless groups is long-standing, and that the 
crack, marijuana, and child pornography sentencing Guidelines 
are only the most recent incarnations of an unsavory reoccurrence 
in American history. In all of these areas, the legislature is faced 
with the question of how to allocate, and hopefully to minimize, 
harm. The shift from the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793 to the Law 
of 1850 moved the economic and enforcement burdens of the law 
from Southern constituents to the Northern populace and espe-
cially to the African American population of those Northern 
states. This shift was intended to prevent the breakup of the Union, 
a harm that the legislature viewed as greater than any caused by 
the burden placed on Northern states.260 In the context of the drug 
and child pornography possession Guidelines, the legislature re-
sponded to the harms caused by drugs and child pornography by 
attempting to shift those harms to the people committing those 
crimes. In this attempt, however, Congress was overzealous and 
did not properly account for all of the relevant circumstances. Ul-
timately, this overzealousness resulted in select groups becoming 
overburdened, creating excess harm in the exact area that Con-
gress was attempting to fix. 
 
 258 See James Oliver Horton and Lois E. Horton, A Federal Assault: African Ameri-
cans and the Impact of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, 68 Chi Kent L Rev 1179, 1183–85 
(1993) (discussing the experience of Henry Highland Garnet and other antebellum black 
leaders with the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793 and the potential danger the law posed to 
both free and formerly enslaved African Americans). 
 259 See generally id (discussing the dire impact of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 on 
African Americans).  
 260 See Jeffrey Rogers Hummel and Barry R. Weingast, The Fugitive Slave Act of 
1850: Symbolic Gesture or Rational Guarantee? *2 (Jan 2006), archived at 
http://perma.cc/GA9X-R359 (discussing the Compromise of 1850, including the reasons for 
the South’s push for the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, and noting that one scholar stated 
that the South’s push for that act “risk[ed] [ ] getting enmeshed in a destructive Civil War”). 
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One additional lesson relevant for the current state of federal 
marijuana crimes appears in evaluating the history of the Fugitive 
Slave Laws. These acts show that if there is a way for the federal 
government to allow the states to implement the will of their cit-
izens, the states should be allowed to experiment unless that ex-
perimentation would cause disproportionate harm to a histori-
cally unrepresented or underrepresented group.261 
IV.  EVALUATING THE 18 USC § 3553(A) FACTORS IN LIGHT OF 
INCREASINGLY LAX MARIJUANA LAWS 
The three analogues to the marijuana Guidelines all share a 
common feature: they allow the political branches to pursue a 
popular goal––appearing tough on crime or desperately attempt-
ing to keep the Union together––at the expense of a politically 
unpopular or relatively powerless group. In the drug-sentencing 
realm, that politically unpopular group remains the same as it 
was in the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850: African Americans. 
History seems to be repeating itself in the current regime of 
federal marijuana laws. Just as with crack, a disproportionate 
number of those arrested for marijuana-based crimes are African 
American.262 This is in spite of the fact that African Americans 
report similar rates of marijuana use as other races.263 This dis-
proportionate arrest rate is exacerbated by the fact that, accord-
ing to an analysis of ACLU data by Stanford psychiatry Professor 
Keith Humphreys, those states that have legalized or decriminal-
ized marijuana have tended to have a below average population 
of African Americans.264 Ultimately, this means that while it primar-
ily is white entrepreneurs in states like Colorado and Washington 
who build businesses and profit from the federal government’s 
choice not to enforce marijuana laws, African Americans in the 
rest of the country continue to bear the brunt of criminal marijuana 
 
 261 This idea is discussed further in Part IV.B.2. For an alternate, yet similar, theory 
of how federalism issues might play out in the marijuana context, see J. Mitchell Pickerill 
and Paul Chen, Medical Marijuana Policy and the Virtues of Federalism, 38 Publius 22, 
23 (2008) (putting forth a three-part test for determining when state policies should be 
allowed to operate based on whether experimentation is adding to the substantive debate, 
whether there is an issue of “regional diversity,” and “whether state [experimentation] 
would protect and/or enhance individual rights and liberties”). 
 262 Dylan Matthews, The Black/White Marijuana Arrest Gap, in Nine Charts (Wash 
Post, June 4, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/X98J-WTDS. 
 263 Id. 
 264 See Keith Humphreys, Persistent Racial Differences under Softening Marijuana 
Enforcement (The Reality-Based Community, June 4, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/ 
QA8R-4XJT. 
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prosecutions.265 While this increasing geography-based disparity 
might be a function of nonracial factors like religion, that does not 
change the fact that the disparate racial impact is being exacer-
bated by the federal government’s actions. Therefore, it is appro-
priate to consider it as a factor in determining the merits of those 
federal actions. As Vice Chairman Gelacak once noted in another 
area of sentencing law, “If the impact of the law is discriminatory, 
the problem is no less real regardless of the intent.”266 
As both the Supreme Court and other members of the judiciary 
have noted throughout history, when a political minority, espe-
cially one that has been as historically discriminated against as 
African Americans, bears the burden of a politically motivated ac-
tivity like the promulgation of the marijuana Guidelines, it is not 
only the role but the duty of the judiciary to intervene and to pro-
vide an especially searching analysis of the issue.267 While the ju-
diciary may not feel the pull of this duty in other areas of the law 
in which there is a disparate impact without a clear discrimina-
tory intent, this is not the case in the jurisprudence surrounding 
sentencing. In this realm, Kimbrough and its history show that 
federal judges and justices, perhaps in recognition that sentenc-
ing is traditionally their area of expertise, are willing and able to 
mitigate an outsized load placed on the shoulders of minorities.268 
Moreover, this is not an area of the law that relies purely on the 
internal ethos of the judiciary for action. Because of the 18 USC 
§ 3553(a) sentencing factors, judges have a statutory mandate to 
account for unwarranted sentencing disparities.269 
 
 265 See April M. Short, Michelle Alexander: White Men Get Rich from Legal Pot, Black 
Men Stay in Prison (AlterNet, Mar 16, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/3DTY-6UTH 
(covering an interview with Professor Michelle Alexander, in which she detailed how it 
primarily was white businessmen who were profiting from the distribution of marijuana, 
a more wide-scale version of the same activity that has disproportionately criminalized 
African Americans); Angela Bacca, The Unbearable Whiteness of the Marijuana Industry 
(AlterNet, Mar 31, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/8SGR-4HAE (noting that there is 
only one African American–owned marijuana dispensary in the state of Colorado). 
 266 Gelacak Opinion at *2 (cited in note 204). 
 267 For examples and analysis of the judiciary’s intervention in the Fugitive Slave 
Laws, see Part III.C. The proposition that it is the role of the judiciary to intervene when 
particular categories of minorities are burdened by the political process was most famously 
enunciated in United States v Carolene Products Co, 304 US 144, 152 n 4 (1938) (“[P]rejudice 
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition . . . which may call for 
a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”). 
 268 See Parts III.A.2–3. 
 269 See 18 USC § 3553(a)(6). 
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This Part proceeds as follows: Part IV.A discusses an appli-
cation of the § 3553(a) sentencing factors to marijuana crimes, fo-
cusing primarily on the requirements to adequately account for 
the seriousness of the offense and the need to avoid unwarranted 
sentencing disparities. Part IV.B then presents possible solutions 
based on this analysis. 
A. Application of the § 3553(a) Sentencing Factors to 
Marijuana 
State legalization of marijuana for medical and recreational 
use has created a direct conflict with federal drug laws. Recogniz-
ing legalization as a potential national wave, the various actors 
within the federal government have adopted a policy of toleration 
of this conflict through selective enforcement of the federal drug 
laws surrounding marijuana. This selective enforcement policy, 
however, has created a problem for the federal judiciary. The stat-
utorily mandated sentencing factors require district courts to 
avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities and to ensure that sen-
tences reflect the seriousness of the offense. Because individuals 
possessing and distributing marijuana are now treated like legal 
business owners by the federal government in some states, and 
felons in others, the judiciary is placed at a crossroads when sen-
tencing defendants for marijuana-based crimes. 
1. The seriousness of the offense. 
The increasing proliferation of both medical and recreational 
marijuana legalization, as well as the revelation that a majority 
of the country’s population seems to support legalization in some 
form, has greatly decreased the relative seriousness of marijuana 
offenses in the eyes of American society. While the federal gov-
ernment categorizes marijuana as a Schedule I substance under 
§ 202 of the Controlled Substances Act,270 this categorization is at 
odds with an increasingly large body of medical research that sug-
gests that marijuana could have a medically beneficial effect.271 
Also, the federal statute establishing the punishment level for 
 
 270 Pub L No 91-513, 84 Stat 1242, 1247–49 (1970), codified as amended at 21 USC 
§ 812 (listing marijuana as a Schedule I drug). 
 271 See Report to the Legislature and Governor of the State of California Presenting 
Findings pursuant to SB847 Which Created the CMCR and Provided State Funding *10–
15 (Center for Medicinal Cannabis Research, University of California, Feb 11, 2010), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/3NCA-STLG (examining ten years of research on the possible 
medical effects of marijuana). 
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possessing different types of contraband in prison seems to recog-
nize marijuana’s seriousness as not being in the same category as 
other Schedule I substances.272 That statute calls for marijuana to 
be punished in a like manner to Schedule III substances.273 There 
is additionally at least one study that suggests that the Guide-
lines that apply to drug-related crimes are wildly out of step with 
regular citizens’ perceptions of the sentences needed to appropri-
ately punish criminals.274 
The Fugitive Slave Laws and the cases surrounding them 
suggest that there is a history of state opposition to what citizens 
consider morally repugnant federal laws, and of the federal gov-
ernment, including the judicial branch, allowing the states lee-
way to operate around those laws.275 This indicates that, because 
there are not countervailing disproportionate harms to un-
derrepresented groups or infringements on individuals’ rights 
caused by state experimentation,276 all branches of the federal 
government, including the judiciary, should utilize their discre-
tion to allow state experimentation. 
Similarly, both the history of the crack–powder cocaine ratio 
and the current implementation of the child pornography Guide-
lines provide clear analogies to the Guidelines for marijuana-
related crimes. Both of these portions of the Guidelines represent 
deviations from the Commission’s typical empirical approach to 
the creation of sentences in favor of Guidelines created by politi-
cally motivated actors. Much like the crack–powder cocaine ratio, 
the Guidelines for marijuana were based on the 1986 Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act drug weights and have only recently begun to be re-
vised.277 It also bears repeating that Kimbrough and its progeny 
ensure that judges are free to vary from the Guidelines if they 
reasonably believe the recommended sentence does not properly 
 
 272 See 18 USC § 1791(d)(1)(B) (categorizing marijuana along with Schedule III drugs 
for the purposes of punishment for possessing contraband in prison). 
 273 18 USC § 1791(d)(1)(B). 
 274 See James S. Gwin, Juror Sentiment on Just Punishment: Do the Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines Reflect Community Values?, 4 Harv L & Pol Rev 173, 186–92 (2010) (ob-
serving that, when given the chance, jurors would recommend sentences vastly below the 
Guidelines ranges in almost all cases, and especially in drug-related cases). 
 275 See generally, for example, Prigg, 41 US (16 Pet) 539 (holding one Pennsylvania 
antislavery law unconstitutional, while maintaining another avenue for the states to resist 
the Fugitive Slave Laws). 
 276 See note 261 and accompanying text. 
 277 See Saris, 52 Am Crim L Rev at 16–17 (cited in note 23). 
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reflect the seriousness of the offense and the other § 3553(a) 
factors.278 
The question remains whether this analysis properly ac-
counts for the personal and societal harms that originally led to 
marijuana’s prohibition. The answer to that question is: maybe, 
or maybe not.279 As this Comment shows, however, the American 
people are increasingly coming to the conclusion that the per-
ceived harms of marijuana have been overstated, and are pushing 
all levels of state and federal government to correct course. 
Section 3553(a)(2)(A) calls not only for the sentence imposed 
to account for the seriousness of the offense, but also for the sen-
tence to “promote respect for the law.”280 It is difficult to imagine 
that ignoring the fact that citizens in over half of the states have 
decided to allow either medical or recreational marijuana use 
could “promote respect” for the federal law.281 Likewise, that the 
liberalization of state marijuana laws has happened with what 
can only be described as the blessing of both politically accountable 
branches of the federal government282 suggests that failure to 
modify sentences to account for the current state of affairs could 
lead to the belief that the judiciary is out of touch with current 
societal mores, and thus lessen faith in the federal judiciary, and 
the sentences it imposes, more generally.283 Although the judiciary 
is often viewed as an antimajoritarian bulwark, operating too far 
outside the bounds of contemporary society risks irrelevancy or 
revolt. Indeed, given the prevalence of state referenda that flout 
federal drug laws, citizens might be primed to subvert the rulings 
of the judiciary on marijuana-related issues. Given this, at least 
 
 278 See Part I.B. 
 279 This question is ultimately a balancing test that must be answered both empiri-
cally (on a societal level) and personally (on an individual level). Realistically, it can be 
answered with any certainty only by a retrospective study of solutions based on this analysis. 
 280 18 USC § 3553(a)(2)(A). 
 281 Indeed, the theme of popular revolt against an out of touch political class that 
ignores the will of the people has reached new levels of salience in the 2016 presidential 
election. See Derek Thompson, Who Are Donald Trump’s Supporters, Really? (The Atlantic, 
Mar 1, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/B92R-DGUL (noting that the single best predic-
tor of someone supporting Trump for president was agreement with the statement “people 
like me don’t have any say about what the government does”). 
 282 See Part II.B. 
 283 See Gelacak Opinion at *4–5 (cited in note 204) (noting that “[b]ad laws weaken 
respect of good laws” and that sentences based on unwarranted disparities could lead to 
“retributive behavior”). 
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in the drug law context, the seriousness of the offense must be 
tied to popular will.284 
2. Avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities. 
Ensuring similar treatment of similarly situated offenders 
was a driving force behind the creation of the Commission and the 
Guidelines. The Supreme Court has upheld this mission in its re-
peated emphasis of the importance of the § 3553(a) sentencing 
factors.285 Although state laws may differ, federal law should at-
tempt to treat similarly situated actors similarly. Congress and 
the executive branch may have chosen to ignore this tenet by ad-
vocating for selective enforcement, but the judiciary has not been 
afforded that luxury. Judges are bound to implement § 3553(a)(6), 
which calls for the avoidance of “unwarranted sentence dispari-
ties among defendants with similar records who have been found 
guilty of similar conduct.”286 
Like Judge Bredar, this Comment construes this language 
broadly, as a mandate to ensure equal treatment of similarly sit-
uated defendants.287 In the context of nonenforcement of federal 
 
 284 An alternate conception of the “seriousness of the offense” that is removed from 
the will of the populace might be an evaluation of the harm caused by an offender in the 
commission of his crime. This harm measurement seems to be implied when courts use 
§ 3553(a)(2)(A) in other criminal contexts. See, for example, United States v Stanley, 644 
Fed Appx 935, 941 (11th Cir 2016) (per curiam) (noting that upward variance from the 
Guidelines was reasonable because the defendant was convicted of “shooting at a police 
officer in Florida, robbing a bank with pistols and an AK–47 type rifle, firing shots inside 
of an occupied bank, fleeing across state lines, and shooting at police during a high-speed 
chase”); United States v Webster, 820 F3d 944, 945 (8th Cir 2016) (per curiam) (noting that 
a district court justified a 120-month sentence because “the Guidelines did not adequately 
take into account the seriousness of the offense: Webster had discharged the subject fire-
arm into a fleeing vehicle, narrowly missing the driver”). Within the marijuana context, 
the emerging medical research on marijuana, as well as the number of states willing to 
decriminalize or legalize the substance, suggest that the harm caused by marijuana, 
whether physical or societal, is less than the Guidelines make it out to be. 
 285 See Part I.B. 
 286 18 USC § 3553(a)(6). 
 287 See Dayi, 980 F Supp 2d at 689. A similarly broad interpretation of 18 USC 
§ 3553(a)(6) has occurred in the fast-track context, in which defendants in some districts 
were able to take advantage of a downward departure from the Guidelines by entering a 
guilty plea and waiving certain rights, but others were not. This discrepancy occurred en-
tirely because the fast-track programs were not implemented uniformly across federal dis-
tricts. District courts used this lack of federal uniformity to allow defendants in non-fast-track 
districts to take advantage of the downward departure they would have been allowed if 
they were in a fast-track district. See Tom McKay, Note, Judicial Discretion to Consider 
Sentencing Disparities Created by Fast-Track Programs: Resolving the Post-Kimbrough 
Circuit Split, 48 Am Crim L Rev 1423, 1433–35, 1441–44 (2011) (discussing circuits that 
allowed district courts to impose fast-track-equivalent sentences). 
 2016] Learning from History in Changing Times 2151 
 
marijuana laws, this broad interpretation seems to be the most 
sensible one. It would be counterintuitive to allow this provision 
designed to reduce sentencing disparities to magnify them in-
stead because of the deliberate and widespread selective enforce-
ment of federal laws. Additionally, the departure granted by 
Bredar in Dayi should be seen as the beginning of a snowball roll-
ing downhill. Even if § 3553(a)(6) were read to require a formal 
adjudication of guilt to invoke its equality principle, the defend-
ants in Dayi should be considered “similar” for the purposes of the 
statute, and future defendants should gain the benefit of a com-
parable downward variance. 
Notably, although it is possible that Dayi is extraordinary, in 
that it is the first case to utilize this specific reasoning, it is abso-
lutely pedestrian in its result. After Booker and its progeny 
granted judges increased discretion in sentencing, the percentage 
of non-government-sponsored below-Guidelines sentences 
granted for marijuana offenses steadily rose from approximately 
9 percent in the portion of 2005 immediately following Booker288 
to a high of over 21 percent in 2014,289 before falling to approxi-
mately 17 percent in 2015.290 When government-sponsored below-
Guidelines sentences are included in this figure, the extent of the 
number of judges regularly departing from the Guidelines be-
comes even more dramatic. In 2015, over half of all defendants 
sentenced for federal marijuana crimes received below-Guidelines 
sentences,291 and in 2014, fully 67 percent of marijuana defend-
ants received below-Guidelines sentences.292 
In spite of this, opponents of more lax marijuana sentencing 
might argue that § 3553(a)(6) calls for the avoidance of unwar-
ranted sentencing disparities between like defendants and that in 
states where marijuana has been legalized in some form, a dis-
parity in sentencing compared to those states where marijuana 
has not been legalized is warranted because of the regulatory 
 
 288 See Sentences Relative to the Guideline Range for Drug Offenders by Each Drug 
Type: Fiscal Year 2005, Post-Booker (January 12, 2005, through September 30, 2005) *2, 
archived at http://perma.cc/3XB3-X2CA. 
 289 See Sentences Relative to the Guideline Range for Drug Offenders in Each Drug 
Type: Fiscal Year 2014 *2, archived at http://perma.cc/NW4J-ZBXH (“2014 Drug Sen-
tences Relative to the Guidelines Range”). 
 290 See Sentences Relative to the Guideline Range for Drug Offenders in Each Drug 
Type: Fiscal Year 2015 *2, archived at http://perma.cc/G9RE-Z8YG. 
 291 See id. 
 292 See 2014 Drug Sentences Relative to the Guidelines Range at *2 (cited in note 289). 
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regimes created by the states. This argument has some force. In-
deed, at its logical extreme this argument would suggest that the 
status quo of selective federal enforcement is exactly what should 
be happening. There are several issues with this interpretation, 
however. First, this could lead to the creation of fifty wildly dif-
ferent sentencing regimes, based purely on the intricacies of state 
law and policy. This issue is already arising in the current system, 
because current federal nonenforcement requires “unambiguous 
compliance” with state law.293 This means not only that growers and 
distributors face harsh sentences294 if they are found to have sold 
marijuana for recreational use in a state where only medical use is 
permitted, but that those same sentences could be imposed if they 
are out of line with any of the specific nuances of state law, which 
otherwise have little to do with traditional notions of marijuana’s 
harmfulness.295 
Proponents of this selective nonenforcement might also argue 
that this is no different from prosecutors exercising their discre-
tion differently in various jurisdictions. Smaller crimes in busier 
districts might not be prosecuted as vigorously as they are in 
other districts. The difference here is the institutionalized and 
disparate nature of the nonenforcement. This is not a local office 
deciding to focus on some crimes deemed of more local import; it 
is a centrally made decision to disparately enforce the law on a 
national level, to the disproportionate benefit of white citizens 
and the disproportionate detriment of black ones. 
B. Three Possible Solutions: Full Enforcement, No 
Enforcement, and the Middle Ground 
While there are an infinite number of possible solutions to 
the problem created by the interaction of federal nonenforcement 
of marijuana laws and the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, all of 
 
 293 See Ogden Memo (cited in note 109). 
 294 Commercial-level growers and distributors of marijuana could face potentially 
mammoth amounts of jail time because the Guidelines suggest offense level by drug 
weight. See, for example, John Ingold, A Colorado Marijuana Guide: 64 Answers to Com-
monly Asked Questions (Denver Post, Dec 31, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/YEE8 
-QR38 (noting that some recreational stores can have up to 10,000 marijuana plants, 
equivalent to 1,250 pounds of marijuana, enough to invoke a mandatory minimum ten-
year sentence and a $10 million fine). 
 295 For example, marijuana dispensaries in Colorado are allowed to operate only be-
tween the hours of 8 a.m. and midnight. See id. While making a sale at 7 a.m. might seem 
like a small slight of state law, it opens up the dispensary to the full brunt of federal pros-
ecution, including possible mandatory minimum sentences. 
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these solutions lay between two extremes: total enforcement of 
the law and total abdication of enforcing the law. Both of these 
extremes are problematic, and so a middle ground solution is the 
most likely to satisfy the various competing interests at stake. 
1. Both full enforcement and total nonenforcement of 
marijuana laws are possible, albeit problematic, 
solutions. 
The preceding analysis proposes a solution with two logical 
extremes. One extreme would suggest that the federal govern-
ment should fully enforce the marijuana laws in every state re-
gardless of state laws, and the federal judiciary should strictly 
abide by the Guidelines in order to minimize sentencing dispari-
ties. At this extreme, no downward variance should be given for 
the seriousness of the offense without a more explicit federal di-
rective that marijuana-based offenses should be deemed less se-
rious crimes. This directive might come in the form of removal of 
marijuana from Schedule I of the Controlled Substances Act. This 
solution, however, is essentially a return to the mandatory regime 
invalidated by Booker, and under that regime the issue of disparate 
enforcement against African Americans was in full force.296 With 
respect to marijuana, this racially disparate enforcement might 
seem especially problematic. Given the demographics of the 
states that have passed some form of legalization,297 the sugges-
tion might be that the political will to continue marijuana enforce-
ment is not based in the majority’s disapproval of marijuana, but 
in the desire to criminalize racial minorities.298 
The other extreme solution says that if the Department of 
Justice is willing to forego prosecution of marijuana laws in some 
 
 296 See Part I.B. 
 297 See Humphreys, Persistent Racial Differences under Softening Marijuana Enforce-
ment (cited in note 264). 
 298 This is in no way meant to posit that this is actually what is happening. There are, 
of course, alternate, nonracial, possible explanations for the geographic regions that have 
legalized marijuana. More religious citizens, for instance, tend to be less likely to use or 
have experimented with marijuana, and so states with an outsized proportion of religious 
citizens may be more likely to continue prohibition. See McCarthy, More Than Four in 10 
Americans Say They Have Tried Marijuana (cited in note 156). For the purposes of this 
Comment, whether or not race-based reasoning is actually underlying this trend is less 
important than the optics and potential interpretation. Given the country’s past treatment 
of African Americans in the area of drug criminalization, see Part III.A, a perceived racial 
intent could lead to a diminution of respect for the law of federal sentences, a factor courts 
are statutorily required to consider. See 18 USC § 3553(a)(6). 
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states, it should, absent exceptional circumstances, forego prose-
cution in all states and leave the prosecution of marijuana-based 
crimes to state and local prosecutors. Under this solution, any fed-
eral marijuana-based crimes that were prosecuted (for example, 
interstate trafficking offenses or marijuana charges brought as 
part of charging a conspiracy to commit other federal crimes) 
would receive sentences that attempted to treat those crimes as 
if the marijuana-based component did not occur. This solution is 
problematic in several ways. First, unless “exceptional circum-
stances” was interpreted incredibly broadly, crimes that need to 
be deterred at the federal level would be left undeterred. Depend-
ing on the definition of “exceptional circumstances” under this hy-
pothetical test, a large number of crimes that cannot be fully or 
properly prosecuted on the state level could go unprosecuted, and 
therefore undeterred. Second, complete federal nonenforcement 
could promote an equal or greater disrespect for the rule of law 
than either selective enforcement or full enforcement. In a similar 
vein, nonenforcement also suggests a wild abuse of discretion by 
federal officials, and could lead to a standard of selective nonen-
forcement for any number of laws, depending on which way the 
political winds might blow. This differs from the discretion af-
forded the federal judiciary. Unlike federal judges, federal prose-
cutors are not hired with lifetime tenure and have their discretion 
curtailed and guided by the attorney general, who is a political 
appointee. 
2.  Large downward variances from the Guidelines, 
resulting primarily in noncustodial sentences, are the 
optimal solution to selective federal enforcement. 
As is often the case, the best solution is probably somewhere 
in the middle. The lessons of the Fugitive Slave Laws suggest that 
the Department of Justice should continue to allow states to ex-
periment with various forms of legalization, as those states’ citi-
zens would prefer. In the case of both the Fugitive Slave Laws 
and marijuana legalization, the federal government could either 
preempt state will through strict enforcement or allow the states 
to experiment as they please. The history of the Fugitive Slave 
Laws suggests that to the extent that the will of the states can be 
implemented while minimizing external harm, the federal gov-
ernment should allow that experimentation to occur. In the Fugitive 
Slave Laws context, that meant allowing Northern states to cir-
cumvent the Fugitive Slave Laws while still formally keeping a 
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procedure for returning escaped enslaved persons in place as an 
appeasement for the Southern states. Additionally, this early re-
gime afforded greater protection of the rights of free African 
Americans. 
The current status of federal nonenforcement of marijuana 
laws is akin to the first Fugitive Slave Law. The draconian nature 
of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, however, increased the likeli-
hood of conflict. Although it seems unlikely that full enforcement 
of federal marijuana laws would lead to another Civil War, given 
that states began passing marijuana legislation before any indi-
cation of federal permissiveness, continued experimentation with 
legalization seems possible even in the face of extreme federal en-
forcement. Because extreme federal enforcement would, by defi-
nition, mean utilizing federal law enforcement officials to shut 
down state-legal businesses, the reality of police raids on people 
once considered entrepreneurs could seem draconian in a similar 
way as the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 did in its time. This could 
foment resentment and resistance toward the federal government. 
Moreover, both drug crimes and the Fugitive Slave Laws are 
examples of federal law providing an overlay on subjects largely 
considered the province of the states.299 This connection suggests 
that the lessons from the Fugitive Slave Laws may be especially 
relevant to the marijuana realm. Indeed, this connection illumi-
nates an important difference between marijuana enforcement 
and the Fugitive Slave Laws. While both situations provide ex-
amples of the federal government imposing on a particular sub-
ject matter otherwise dominated by the states, interstate conflict 
is relatively absent in the context of marijuana legalization. As 
such, when the Fugitive Slave Laws failed at assuaging the con-
flict between states, the backlash caused the states to turn on 
each other. Federal marijuana enforcement, however, sets up a 
conflict primarily between the state and the federal government. 
Any potential backlash by the states would, therefore, likely take 
aim at federal policy. Indeed, the roots of this revolt can be seen 
in Washington, DC. After the city legalized recreational marijuana 
in 2014 by popular initiative, Congress used its power over the 
city’s budget to block the implementation of a regulatory regime 
 
 299 The vast majority of people who interact with the criminal justice system come 
into contact with it on the state level. See Lauren E. Glaze and Danielle Kaeble, Correc-
tional Populations in the United States, 2013 *12 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, Dec 2014), 
archived at http://perma.cc/7CUX-UUMP (noting that of over 2 million inmates incarcer-
ated in 2013, only approximately 215,000 were in federal prisons). 
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for marijuana sales.300 In response to this obstruction, the city de-
veloped a “gift economy” in marijuana,301 and, in 2016, it mounted 
a successful legal challenge that would effectively overturn the 
congressional-funding blockade.302 
In states that have not passed laws legalizing marijuana in 
any form, the 2013 Cole Memo provides a structure for curtailing 
prosecutorial discretion that could lead to either unwarranted 
sentencing disparities or overly harsh prosecutions in the regime 
of selective enforcement. Additionally, applying the general struc-
ture of the 2013 Cole Memo in those states that have not legalized 
marijuana ensures that any harm caused by the lack of a state 
regulatory regime is minimized. 
For those cases that are prosecuted under this regime, this 
Comment’s analysis suggests that to the extent the defendant’s 
crime is the possession or distribution of marijuana, judges 
should impose a noncustodial sentence. This noncustodial solu-
tion takes as its inspiration the outcome of Gall.303 In that case, a 
defendant for whom the Guidelines recommended years of impris-
onment instead received a noncustodial sentence because the dis-
trict court recognized that a faithful application of the § 3553(a) 
factors did not require imposing a term of imprisonment.304 As a 
statement of law, this case can simply be said to stand for the 
proposition that although the Guidelines may be a touchstone, 
they cannot restrain the court from instituting a sentence based 
on a full application of § 3553.305 More fundamentally, this non-
custodial baseline attempts to prevent the extreme outcome that 
a deprivation of liberty through incarceration represents for de-
fendants convicted of actions that both the American populace 
and the Department of Justice have deemed not to warrant 
prosecution in many circumstances. From this baseline, custodial 
 
 300 See Aaron C. Davis, Budget Bill Outlaws Pot Sales in D.C. for 2 Years (Wash Post, 
June 11, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/GW7H-A8SR. 
 301 Josh Barro, Can Washington’s Gift Economy in Marijuana Work? (NY Times, Mar 
20, 2015), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/21/upshot/can-washington-dcs-gift 
-economy-in-marijuana-work.html (visited May 20, 2016) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 302 See Chloe Sommers, D.C. Superior Court Clears Hurdle for Legal Marijuana Sales 
(Marijuana Times, Mar 30, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/864E-LN4R (discussing the 
history of marijuana legalization in Washington, DC, and the court decision that returned 
budget autonomy to the city from Congress). See also generally Council of the District of 
Columbia v Dewitt, 2016 WL 1109117 (DC Super). 
 303 See Gall, 552 US at 53–56. 
 304 Id (discussing Gall’s reformation from his criminal past and withdrawal from the 
drug conspiracy at issue). 
 305 See id at 46–50, 53–56. 
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sentences may be appropriate for acts such as targeting sales to 
children or using weapons or violence while pursuing the goal of 
distribution.306 
These primarily noncustodial sentences still ensure a level of 
deterrence against crimes that are best prosecuted at the federal 
level and recognize the importance of punishment in the face of a 
violation of the rule of law. These offenders will still suffer the 
harms that occur from a federal criminal (and likely felony) con-
viction,307 as well as the numerous noncustodial restrictions that 
a district court is able to impose on a defendant. These re-
strictions might include a lengthy term of probation, with any 
number of defendant-specific conditions such as mandatory drug 
testing, drug treatment, and limitations on contact with certain 
individuals.308 This also properly accounts for the seriousness of 
the offense by recognizing that although a majority of the adult 
population favors legalization of marijuana, that desire may not 
yet be recognized in an enactment of Congress due to anomalies 
in the political process that lead political actors to pursue tough-
on-crime policies that the national majority does not prefer. 
Additionally, if large variances from the Guidelines in these 
cases become the norm, they could, as they did in the crack ratio 
cases, fulfill the ideal of the feedback loop between the district 
courts and the Commission that the Guidelines originally envi-
sioned. When functioning properly, this feedback loop has the op-
portunity to cause both the Commission and Congress to reeval-
uate the state of marijuana sentencing using the empirical 
methods that the Commission was designed to implement. In-
deed, for the first time since the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse 
Act of 1986, it appears that both of these bodies may be amenable 
to a serious departure from the current state of the Guidelines. 
 
 306 See, for example, USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1) (increasing the potential sentence of a drug 
trafficking defendant for possessing a dangerous weapon in the commission of the offense); 
USSG § 2D1.1(b)(2) (increasing the potential sentence for a drug trafficking defendant if 
she “used violence, made a credible threat to use violence, or directed the use of violence”). 
 307 For a thorough examination of the negative impact that a criminal conviction can 
have on a defendant, including the vast array of collateral consequences felons face, see 
generally Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Color-
blindness (New Press 2010); David J. Norman, Note, Stymied by the Stigma of a Criminal 
Conviction: Connecticut and the Struggle to Relieve Collateral Consequences, 31 Quinnipiac 
L Rev 985 (2013). 
 308 See, for example, Hanson, 561 F Supp 2d at 1012 (explaining the additional stric-
tures imposed upon the defendant during his noncustodial supervised release term follow-
ing his term of imprisonment). 
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Although this Comment has focused primarily on 
§ 3553(a)(2)(A) and § 3553(a)(6), this solution establishes a base-
line that comports with the other sentencing factors in a typical 
case of marijuana distribution. By utilizing the full range of non-
custodial options available, the requirement to avoid a sentence 
greater than necessary is fulfilled,309 as is the required considera-
tion of the “kinds of sentences available.”310 Additionally, the stric-
tures of probation can ensure a proper level of deterrence, can be 
tailored to ensure that society is “protect[ed] . . . from further 
crimes of the defendant,” and can require the defendant to un-
dergo necessary self-improvements.311 Finally, by accounting for 
the disparities created by federal nonenforcement and evolving 
sentiment surrounding marijuana, this solution ensures that im-
posed sentences promote respect for the law by comporting with 
the majority of the populace’s sense of justice.312 Perhaps most im-
portantly, by focusing primarily on what should occur based on 
only two of the § 3553 factors in a mine-run case, this solution 
leaves substantial leeway for sentencing judges to exercise their 
discretion in ensuring that a defendant is treated with the indi-
vidualized assessment required by Congress and the Supreme 
Court’s sentencing jurisprudence. 
Critics of this solution might come from both ends of the le-
galization spectrum. An advocate for legalization might argue 
that this solution still creates sentencing disparities between like 
actors. While this is true, the only way to totally avoid sentencing 
disparities in this realm is to create either a prosecution regime 
that operates without regard to state law or a sentencing regime 
in which guilty defendants receive no judicially imposed punish-
ment. A prosecution regime that operates without regard to state 
law falls within the realm of prosecutorial discretion, and is akin 
to the extreme no-punishment solution described above. The sec-
ond possibility, of no judicially imposed punishment whatsoever, 
is likely to be viewed as an abuse of discretion by appellate courts, 
and could lead to the perception that the judiciary does not re-
spect the rule of law it is meant to uphold. A tangible, yet noncus-
todial, sentence avoids these issues. 
 
 309 18 USC § 3553(a). 
 310 18 USC § 3553(a)(3). 
 311 18 USC § 3553(a)(2)(B)–(D). 
 312 See 18 USC § 3553(a)(2)(A) (requiring judges to take into account the need for the 
sentence “to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense”). 
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Legalization opponents might argue that this solution does 
not do enough to either deter or punish marijuana offenders, es-
pecially those operating large-scale growth and distribution rings. 
This argument is problematic because it underestimates the 
grievous negative impact and long-lasting effects that noncusto-
dial punishments can have, including collateral consequences like 
the denial of political participation,313 as well as the potential for 
incarceration if the defendant violates the terms of her parole. 
Therefore, even if an opponent of legalization believed that noth-
ing short of a lengthy term of incarceration was appropriate to 
protect society from marijuana offenders, this solution should as-
suage her concern because those offenders who violate the terms 
of their probation will face prison time, and those offenders who 
do not violate the terms of their probation will be acting well 
within society’s expectations of its citizens. Additionally, this ar-
gument ignores that the only difference between a marijuana dis-
tribution ring that commits no other crimes and any other busi-
ness is the product being sold. This middle ground solution thus 
treats marijuana-based and non-marijuana-based businesses 
substantially similarly, while still allowing for enhanced punish-
ment if a marijuana-based business engages in especially harmful 
activities, like sales to children, or if participants commit other 
crimes in their attempt to distribute marijuana. 
CONCLUSION 
State marijuana legalization has created a direct conflict 
with federal drug laws. In response, various actors within the fed-
eral government have adopted a policy of toleration of this conflict 
through selective enforcement of the federal drug laws involving 
marijuana. This policy, however, has created a problem for the 
federal judiciary. The statutory sentencing factors require district 
courts to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities and to ensure 
that sentences reflect the seriousness of the offense. Because in-
dividuals possessing and distributing marijuana are now consid-
ered legal business owners by the federal government in some 
states, and felons in others, the judiciary is placed at a crossroads 
when sentencing a defendant for a marijuana-based crime. 
This Comment provides a potential solution to this issue. By 
taking lessons from history—including the treatment of the Fugitive 
 
 313 See Nora V. Demleitner, “Collateral Damage”: No Re-entry for Drug Offenders, 47 
Vill L Rev 1027, 1040–41 (2002). 
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Slave Laws by the federal and state governments, the federal ju-
diciary’s rebellion against the infamous 100-to-1 crack–powder 
cocaine ratio implemented by Congress and adopted by the Guide-
lines, and the judiciary’s current treatment of the Guidelines’ 
child pornography possession recommendations—it is possible to 
fashion a solution to this issue that respects state autonomy, 
while still accounting for the need to deter and punish violators 
of federal drug laws. 
Ultimately, this Comment provides only a framework and 
baseline, as the need to sentence a defendant based on her spe-
cific, individual actions and characteristics has long been en-
shrined in this country’s jurisprudence. Any potential solution, 
however, should involve consistent––and often large––downward 
variances from the current Guidelines range for marijuana sen-
tences. In light of the Department of Justice’s willingness to al-
most completely forego enforcement of these laws in some states, 
and the rapidly decreasing seriousness of marijuana possession 
and distribution in the eyes of the American public, this Comment 
ultimately concludes that in the core marijuana distribution pros-
ecution, a noncustodial sentence is appropriate regardless of the 
drug weight at issue. 
This solution focuses on the judiciary for three distinct and 
important reasons. First, when creating the Guidelines, the Com-
mission envisioned the federal district courts playing an im-
portant role in the Guidelines’ evolution. By providing feedback 
through careful analysis in its sentencing decisions, and by vary-
ing from the Guidelines when appropriate, the judiciary gives the 
Commission the data necessary to increase the accuracy of the 
Guidelines’ sentencing recommendations. Second, as members of 
the federal judiciary, sentencing judges are free from the pres-
sures that cause political actors to distort the will of the populace, 
and can therefore exercise their discretion to ensure a just result. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the judiciary has long rec-
ognized its role in ensuring that this country’s minorities are not 
subject to the tyranny of the majority. For much, if not all, of their 
duration, the overwhelming weight of the federal drug laws and 
the accompanying Guidelines has fallen on the shoulders of African 
Americans and other minorities. This was true in the realm of 
crack cocaine sentencing, and it is true of marijuana sentencing. 
Left unchecked, selective enforcement of marijuana laws could 
create a world in which it primarily is white citizens who reap the 
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economic benefits of legalization, while it disproportionately is Af-
rican American defendants who continue to be imprisoned for the 
same activities. It is therefore incumbent on the federal judiciary 
to do what it can to ensure that any disparate enforcement of the 
federal criminal laws is minimized to the extent possible. 
Through § 3553(a), it has the tools to do so. 
